



Definitions and Expectations Regarding the New Constitution

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TESEV

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Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

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TESEV Democratization Program

Preface

Özge Genç, TESEV Democratization Program

Turkish Grand National Assembly and the political parties aim to finalize the process to prepare a new constitutional draft by the close of 2012, and we are now nearing the end of that process. This remains one of the most critical phases in the process, and there are lingering questions concerning the level of information and expectations among the public, public perception of the most contentious issues, as well as how and to what extent these are reflected in the draft text. As part of its Monitoring the New Constitutional Process Project, TESEV Democratization Program conducted a wide-ranging study throughout Turkey to be able to understand society's views especially on those more contentious issues.

In neighborhoods and villages of various provinces and districts, a total of 2,699 individuals were surveyed by KONDA on behalf of TESEV, on their expectations, opinions and tendencies relating to the new constitution. The study includes analyses of the social, cultural, economic and demographic characteristics and political identities and preferences that influenced people's responses. The research team's interpretations and evaluations based on the findings are presented at the end of each section and in the conclusion of the report.

One of the most important issues that should be emphasized at the beginning is that there is a clear expectation that the ideal constitution will be the solution for the Kurdish question. At the same time, we observe that opinions diverge most obviously with respect to matters directly related to the demands of Kurds. The right to enjoy life in one's mother tongue, the emphasis on Turkish identity, service provision by local governments in recipients' mother tongue and the stipulation of additional taxes continue to be contentious. Throughout the making of the new constitution, constructive and democratic steps to be taken by political actors will help mitigating these divergences, allaying the fears and enhancing public support and confidence in democratic demands and democracy itself. As a matter of fact, the major progress in society is illustrated by the support extended to fundamental rights and freedoms, the demand for a constitution that is unconditionally in harmony with international agreements and universal principles. It is also revealed by the demand for an accountable state that confronts incidences including Dersim, 6-7 September, Sivas, Madimak and Uludere through restorative mechanisms such as compensation payments or the issuance of an apology.

As efforts to make a new constitution proceed, TESEV Democratization Program will continue monitoring the process through political and social actors and the media, and contributing towards the generation of the necessary knowledge and analyses. TESEV thereby aims to positively contribute to the process and to keep the debate on the constitution alive.

As the survey results demonstrate, the public seeks to make its own constitution; however, it is observed that the level of satisfaction with the process is low. It is necessary to think outside the box and move beyond the constraints of political parties and create a discussion space in which the public will participate broadly. This will ensure that fundamental principles of the state, language, laïcité (religious affairs and courses on religion) and forms of government -issues where the divergence of opinion is more salient- are regulated in a new constitution that has the features of a social contract. Accordingly, once the ongoing preparation of the draft of a new constitution by the representatives of political parties is completed, it is very crucial for the text to be publicly debated in keeping with the principles of deliberative democracy.

1. Executive Summary

ABOUT THE RESEARCH

The research titled “Definitions and Expectations Regarding the New Constitution” has been designed and conducted to survey and evaluate the expectations of individuals representing the above-18 years old adult population in Turkey in regards to the new constitution; to learn their opinions and tendencies in relation to certain fundamental constitutional issues, and also to identify the political, social, cultural, economic and demographic factors that influence these opinions, tendencies and expectations.

The field study was undertaken on 22-23 September 2012. As part of the research, face-to-face interviews were held with 2,699 individuals in their residences in a total of 150 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts in 29 provinces including Ankara.

GENERAL PREFERENCES

- When asked about what the country’s foremost feature should be, 40% of interviewees responded “strong state”, 39.7% responded “stable economy”, 20.3% responded “humanitarian society”. The demand for a humanitarian society is much higher among those segments of the public that are relatively underdeveloped and disadvantaged.
- The first two problems an ideal constitution is expected to solve are the Kurdish issue (53.4%) and the economic situation (40.7%).
- Issues that are expected to be emphasized among the fundamental principles of the constitution include “justice against unfairness” (65.1%) and “equality among all kinds of differences such as Turk, Kurd, Sunni, Alevi (50.4%).
- 68.9% of the interviewees think “nature cannot be sacrificed for the sake of development”.
- In response to “Which of the following options are proper with respect to groups aggrieved by the state for various reasons in such incidences as Dersim, 6-7 September, Sivas Madımak, Uludere (Roboski)?”, 13.5% of the interviewees answered “the state should apologize”, 10.2% “the state should pay compensation”, 45.2% “the state both apologize and pay compensation”, and 31.1% “the state should neither apologize nor pay compensation”.

ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION

- 78.5% of the interviewees thought that “a constitution the entire society participated in and reached a consensus on would be an acceptable one”.
- While 49.9% of interviewees responded “no” to “Is the current constitutional drafting process going in accordance with the conditions you indicated?”, 33.1% said “partially”, and 17% “yes”.

- 74% thought the new constitution must be approved both by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and in a referendum.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION

- 74.9% of interviewees agreed with the proposition that “The constitution should be in harmony with the international agreements Turkey is a party to and with universal principles; and there should be no exceptions in this regard”.
- 82.3% interviewees concurred that “The constitution should include the principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk”.
- While more than two-thirds of the society objected to “It is alright if Ankara were not the capital city”, one-fifth viewed this proposition favorably.

LAÏCITÉ

- Half of the society (50.6%) thought laïcité should be retained as-is in the constitution, while two-fifths responded that although the concept should be retained, “it should be redefined in a way in which the state would maintain equal distance to all religions”. One in every ten people thought laïcité should be removed from the constitution altogether.
- 84.3% answered that the Presidency of Religious Affairs should have a place in the constitution. 84.1% said if the Presidency is to remain in the constitution it should serve all religions and sects, and 78.1% believed that it should continue to exist as a separate entity independent from the state and the government, if it is removed from the constitution.
- Analyzing the answers given to the three questions on the Presidency of Religious Affairs collectively, the views prevailing among the public emerge as follows:
 - 71.4% supported the view that the Presidency should retain its place in the constitution, but it should serve not only the Sunnis but also everyone else;
 - 69.2% preferred that the Presidency be referenced in the constitution, but it should become an institution independent from the state and the government;
 - 62.5% thought the Presidency should be independent and serve everyone;
 - 58.5% responded that the Presidency should be included in the constitution, be independent and serve all.
- Regarding questions religion and ethics courses, 3.6% of the respondents thought these courses should be eliminated, 50.1% answered that they should be mandatory, and 46.3% said they should be elective.
- To the question “What should be the curriculum of the course on religion and ethics, if that course is retained as is?”, three-fourths (76.9%) responded “All religions and sects must be covered in addition to Sunni Islam”, while 23.1% answered “Only Sunni Islam should be covered”.

LANGUAGE

- An overwhelming majority (85%) responded “Turkish only” to the question “What should be the official language of the country?”, while a mere 15% thought “In addition to Turkish, all languages spoken in the country can be an official language”.

-
- To “What should be the language of formal education?”, 73% responded “Turkish only”, while 27% said “In addition to Turkish, anyone can receive education in the language they acquired from their parents and they speak”.
 - The public appears to be undecided or divided into halves in regards to the idea that “Elected local governments should be able to have authority in regards to education and public services in people’s mother tongues or in the language spoken by the local people”: While 40% agreed with this provision, 45% did not.

RIGHTS AND CITIZENSHIP

- 56% of those surveyed thought only Turkish identity must be referenced in the constitution, as it currently stands. 35% said “All ethnic identities including Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, Armenian, Greek, Georgian must be included”. 9% supported the view that there should not be any reference to any identity.
- 70% of the interviewees agreed that the state should stay neutral toward all kinds of individual choices or orientations, such as the headscarf or sexual orientation, irrespective what those preferences may be.
- It is fair to conclude that all segments of the society are in consensus that the state has obligation to protect its citizens against discrimination. 92% of the interviewees responded “agree” or “strongly agree” to the following statement: “The state has an obligation to protect its citizens against discrimination and harassment they might suffer because of their preferences.”
- 72% of those surveyed demanded the recognition of citizens’ freedoms to sustain the group, cultural identity or the community to which they belong.
- 85% of interviewees asserted that the state should intervene to secure the rights of citizens who suffer from pressure within the cultural group to which they belong.
- Three out of every four people (76%) thought that any person who wishes to wear the headscarf should be able to do so, including public employees such as teachers and judges.

LOCAL GOVERNANCE

- Three-fourths of the surveyed supported the idea that “To the extent possible, public services should be administered by local governments elected by the people”.
- 33% concurred that “Elected local governments should be able to introduce additional tax legislation beyond taxation by the central authority, provided that such legislation shall only apply in their respective jurisdictions”, while 48.5% disagreed with that view.

THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

- 84% of the interviewees agreed that “No institution should be excluded from judicial review, including the President, the Government and the Army”.
- “Military Courts should be abolished” is a statement supported by 38% of those surveyed, while a higher percentage (46%) disagreed with it.
- The society appears to be divided into two with respect to “The judiciary should be able to side with the state and against the individual when the reputation and interest of the state are at stake”. 45% supported the statement, while 38% opposed it.

-
- 77% of the interviewees agreed that “The Judiciary has an obligation to protect the individual and not the state, and this obligation must be enshrined in the constitution”. 11% disagreed with this statement.

GOVERNANCE AND THE CHECKS AND BALANCE AMONG INSTITUTIONS

- When asked “In your opinion, who should have the highest authority and power in governing the country?”, 56% responded Turkish Grand National Assembly, 23% head of state or the president, 20% the prime minister or the government.
- 44% responded Constitutional Court when asked “Who should have the ultimate decision making power when there is no consensus among organs of the state? (%)”, while 39% responded Grand National Assembly and 17% the government.

ELECTIONS AND POLITICS

- The proposal “to reduce the election threshold to 4%” received support from 37%, while 42% did not support it.
- Two-thirds of respondents agreed that “Persons who are elected to political offices such as mayors, members of parliament should be liable to be removed from office without waiting for the next election and by way of petitions of a certain number of voters in their respective constituencies”.
- 61% of interviewees concurred that “Political parties should not be shut down for any reason at all, unless they have a clear link to violence”.

MILITARY SERVICE

- 70% of the respondents thought that the compulsory military service currently in effect in regards to all males in Turkey should continue as-is in the new constitution. However, three out of every ten people preferred a transition to a professional army or the availability of the right to conscientious objection or social service in place of compulsory service in the new constitution.

2. Political Profiles of the Respondents

The individuals interviewed as part of the study were asked questions on political strands that “they associated themselves with” and “they felt they belonged to”, in addition to those on demographic properties.

Before discussing findings, following points need to be emphasized:

- When questions were being posed on where individuals see themselves along the right-left axis or which political identity they felt they belonged to, they were not given any explanation of what these terms meant.
- There was no questioning as to an interviewee’s notion of left or right, or what the respondent meant by when saying “nationalist/democrat/conservative”.
- Therefore, it is necessary to keep in mind that interviewees’ responses reflect their own knowledge and feelings about the definitions of these terms.
- It is important to be aware at the outset that the conventional terms of left-right or the definitions relating to political strands in the literature on politics will not strictly correspond to the concepts and definitions the interviewees had in mind.
- Accordingly, it will be wrong to offer interpretations such as “leftist/rightist” or “conservative nationalist/conservative/Atatürkist”¹ on the basis of interviewees’ responses to questions regarding how they positioned themselves politically, and to conclude that there is a contradiction between these responses and those they provided to other questions on the new constitution. Such discrepancies fall beyond the scope of this study.
- In fact, the meaning of political ideologies in ordinary citizens’ daily lives and whether or not their responses to questions are at variance with political science theories is different from questioning the ideological consistence of a political actor.
- The interviewees defined themselves on the basis of their own feelings, knowledge, understandings and realities, and that is how they expressed their expectations and demands concerning the new constitution.

Therefore, the following primarily lists the findings on political identity, belonging and preferences. An effort was made to analyze the expectations and demands from the constitution both on the basis of the political identities and preferences the interviewees indicated, as well as demographic and sociological characteristics such as education/ethnic origin/religion-sect/rural-urban.

¹ Atatürkist ideology enshrined in the 1982 Constitution is based on the views and principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Table 1: There is a longstanding political tradition of right-left-center views in Turkey. How do you define yourself in terms of political view? (%)

Left	%12.8
Center left	%4.2
Center	%15.6
Center right	%4.7
Right	%25.5
None	%37.1
Total	%100.0

37.1% of respondents thought it would be inaccurate to position themselves along the left-right axis and responded “none”. Those who positioned themselves on the left and center left amount to 17%, while 30.2% regard themselves at the right and center right. 15.6% positioned themselves at the center.

Considering the political identities that interviewees associated themselves with, Atatürkists are the largest cluster with 28.2%. Following come Islamists (18.9%), conservatives (15.6%), nationalists (15.1%), democrats (7.2%), social democrats (5.6%), conservative nationalists (4.7%), socialists (2.1%), secular-nationalists (1.8%), and liberals (0.9%).

Table 2: Which political identities/adjectives do you use to describe yourself? (%)

	Percentage
Conservative nationalist	%4.7
Nationalist	%15.1
Conservative	%15.6
Islamist	%18.9
Democrat	%7.2
Liberal	%0.9
Atatürkist	%28.2
Secular-nationalist	%1.8
Social democrat	%5.6
Socialist	%2.1
Total	%100.0

The following table offers an analysis performed on the basis of 1000 individuals, and it is necessary to consider individuals’ positioning of themselves in terms of political identity alongside their positioning along the left-right axis.

For instance, Atatürkists, who form the largest cluster, number 281 among 1,000 individuals, and 71 of them position themselves at the left, 26 at the center left, 25 at the right, and 110 Atatürkists do not position themselves along the left-right axis.

Of the 190 individuals defining themselves as Islamist out of the 1000, 90 do not position themselves at the left or the right, while 65 position themselves as right-winger.

Table 3							
(1,000 PEOPLE)	Left	Center left	Center	Center right	Right	None	Total
Conservative nationalist			5	2	30	10	46
Nationalist	6	1	29	13	54	47	150
Conservative	1	1	28	13	74	40	156
Islamist	4	0	23	7	65	90	190
Democrat	12	4	14	4	8	31	72
Liberal	0	2	2	1	2	2	9
Atatürkist	71	26	44	6	25	110	281
Secular-nationalist	1	2	4	1	2	9	19
Social democrat	27	7	7	2	3	11	56
Socialist	13	1	1			5	21
Total	134	44	157	48	262	355	1.000

44.1% of interviewees said they voted for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), 21.1% for Republican People's Party (CHP), 9.5% for Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and 3.3% for Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the election on June 12.

Excluding those who did not vote because they were under age, cast a blank vote or did not go to the ballot at all, the study findings show that AK Party's vote was 52.5%, CHP's 25.1% and MHP's 11.3%. Considering these along with the actual election results, this indicates that findings are accurate, including the margin of error.

Table 4: In the general election held on 12 June 2011, who or which party did you vote for? (%)			
	Survey findings (%)	Election results according to survey findings (%)	Official election results (%)
AK Party	44.1	52.5	49.8
CHP	21.1	25.1	26.0
MHP	9.5	11.3	13.0
BDP/ Independent	3.3	7.4	6.3
Other Parties	3.1	3.7	4.9
I voted for an independent candidate	2.9		
I was under age at that time	3.1		
I did not go to the ballot, I did not cast a vote	7.8		
I cast a blank vote	5.1		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Considering the respective voter bases of parties alongside political identities, 32.2% of AK Party votes came from those who defined themselves as Islamist, 28.8% from those who defined themselves as conservative, 15.2% from those who defined themselves as nationalist, and 13.2% from those who defined themselves as Atatürkist.

67% of CHP's votes were cast by Atatürkists and 13.4% by social democrats.

39% of MHP's votes came from nationalists, 33.1% from conservative nationalists, and 16.9% from Atatürkists.

	AK Party (%)	CHP (%)	MHP (%)	BDP (%)	Other Parties (%)	Under age (%)	Did not go to the ballot (%)	Cast a blank vote (%)	Turkey (%)
Conservative nationalist	1.7	0.2	33.1	1.2	4.2	2.8	3.3	4.2	4.7
Nationalist	15.2	5.0	39.0	2.4	19.7	12.7	18.8	13.4	15.1
Conservative	28.8	1.0	3.8	1.2	9.9	9.9	10.5	10.9	15.6
Islamist	32.2	1.7	3.4	19.0	25.4	21.1	18.2	10.1	18.9
Democrat	5.0	4.8	2.5	41.7	9.9	4.2	9.9	9.2	7.2
Liberal	0.8	1.3	0.4	0.0	2.8	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.9
Atatürkist	13.2	67.0	16.9	0.0	18.3	40.8	27.6	37.0	28.2
Secular-nationalist	1.0	2.9	0.4	0.0	0.0	2.8	2.2	6.7	1.8
Social democrat	1.8	13.4	0.4	20.2	4.2	1.4	6.1	5.0	5.6
Socialist	0.2	2.7	0.0	14.3	5.6	4.2	2.2	3.4	2.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Similarly, considering the political preferences together with left-right positioning, 48.1% of AK Party's vote came from right-wingers, 58.3% of CHP's vote from left-wingers, and 49% of MHP's vote from right-wingers.


	AK Party (%)	CHP (%)	MHP (%)	BDP (%)	Other Parties (%)	Under age (%)	Did not go to the ballot (%)	Cast a blank vote (%)	Turkey (%)
Left	0.6	43.3	2.1	44.0	9.1	10.7	8.3	3.9	12.8
Center left	0.5	15.0	0.8	3.6	1.3	1.3	3.1	3.1	4.2
Center	16.7	12.4	13.0	3.6	19.5	17.3	18.2	17.2	15.6
Center right	7.0	1.3	8.4		5.2	5.3	2.6	1.6	4.7
Right	41.1	2.5	49.0	2.4	26.0	20.0	12.5	7.0	25.5
None	33.9	25.5	26.8	46.4	39.0	45.3	55.2	67.2	37.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

3. General Preferences and Attitudes

3.1. STRONG STATE OR HUMANITARIAN SOCIETY?

When asked which option they would choose for the country as a matter of general preference, 40% of interviewees responded “strong state”, 39.7% “humanitarian society” and 20.3% “stable economy”.

Graph 1: Which of the following would you prefer for the country, if you needed to choose? (%)



Considering the demographic, sociological and political clusters that constitute these very fundamental priorities, the following findings come to the fore:

While women put more emphasis on a humanitarian society, men prioritize a strong state.

The older the age, the more emphasis on strong state, and the younger the age, the more emphasis on humanitarian society.

Demand for a stable economy rises significantly with higher levels of education.

Individuals who had not attended high school have a much higher demand for both a strong state and a humanitarian society compared to individuals who have a university degree.

Kurds prioritize the demand for a humanitarian society at a much higher rate than Turks do.


Correspondingly, Turks emphasize a strong state at a rate much higher than Kurds do.

As compared to Sunnis, Alevis have a stronger demand for a humanitarian society.

As income level rises, so does the demand for a strong state, and as income level drops, the demand for a humanitarian society is more prevalent.

The more luxurious the residence, the higher the demand for a strong state.

In line with these findings, the following conclusion may be drawn: Those segments and clusters of society that are relatively underdeveloped and aggrieved have a much higher demand for a humanitarian society compared to other segments.




The analysis of political preferences leads to the following findings:

Demand for a humanitarian society is highest among BDP voters, while it is lowest among MHP voters.

The emphasis on a strong state is quite prevalent among AK Party and MHP voters. The voter bases of AK Party and MHP highlight similar preferences.

The preference for a strong state is highest among those who voted in the “affirmative” in the 12 September referendum, while it is lowest among those who “boycotted” the referendum. Boycotters have the strongest demand for a humanitarian society.


In terms of political identities, the demand for a strong state rises and the demand for a humanitarian society drops as one moves from the left to the right. The center right has the highest demand for a stable economy.



As seen in the graph showing preference according to political identities, the demand for a humanitarian society decreases and the demand for a strong state increases as one moves from socialist to conservative nationalist.

The high preference for a “strong state” in the responses to this question and the preference for the “continuity of the state” mentioned in the response to “what should the constitution emphasize most?” (see 3.3, p.23) discussed under the heading below can be analyzed together.

Graph 4: Preference according to political identities (%)



Analysis

First of all, it is necessary to establish the following in regards to the findings we will encounter in this study: The society is never divided into clear-cut categories. Individuals, different social and cultural groups in the society can have multiple definitions, choices or solutions, which might even “appear to be contradictory”, simultaneously in their minds. This particular finding, which is among the most fundamental in this research, does not suggest that the society is categorically “divided into three”. In other words, individuals who, “if they needed to”, would prefer “humanitarian society” can agree with “strong state” in more or less pronounced form, as well.

Considering that individuals constituting the society can experience multiple sentiments simultaneously, it is the upper socio-economic (educated and high-income) groups, which form a rather smaller segment (20.3%) as compared to the other two preferences, who indicated a preference for “stable economy”. Particularly given the word “stability”, this preference voiced mainly by upper socio-economic groups reflects a “rational” perspective. However, the other two preferences that are nearly as prevalent as “burning”, “urgent” matters pertain more to the world of emotions, hardships in life and the solutions sought in the face of those challenges. In other words, 39.7% of the people (no doubt with different interpretations in their minds) state their desire to enjoy all of their rights, live in accordance with a sense of justice, equally and freely (“humanitarian society”). An almost same percentage of the people (40%) indicate that they would, if they needed to, prefer a “strong state”.



Put differently, amidst all of its complexity and tensions, the society both wishes “to be treated as human beings deserve”, “live humanely” and at the same time looks for “security” from the “fear” that the ground society stands upon might shake, and finds that security in the option expressed as a “strong” state.

This in fact points to the fundamental concern of a major segment of the society, including in particular lower socio-economic groups and aggrieved persons: As we will see from the findings below, individuals wish to “enjoy a humane life” (“freedom”, “justice” etc.); but at the same they would like that to be somehow “guaranteed by the state”.

3.2. WHAT WILL AN IDEAL CONSTITUTION SOLVE?

Interviewees were given the open-ended question “Which two urgent problems will an ideal constitution solve?” and asked to provide two answers. The answers were then classified accordingly.²

The first two problems raised most commonly are the Kurdish issue (53.4%) and economic demands (40.7%). These are followed by issues of equality (18.8%), issues within the scope of freedoms and rights (11.8%), and questions of justice (8.9%).



² A complete list of the answers to open-ended questions is available at www.turkeyconstitutionwatch.org.

Considering the table above, the Kurdish issue, as the most important problem that the ideal constitution is expected to address, ranks first for both Turks and Kurds.

Turks and Kurds both ranked economic demands second, as well. However, while 31% of Kurds ranked economic demands second, this percentage is as high as 42% in Turkish respondents.

The solution of the Kurdish issue obviously ranks higher among Kurds, but the remarkable point here is that 53% of Turks also rank it at the highest.

Demands for “equality” and “freedom” from the new constitution have a higher rate among Kurds than in Turks.

The expectation that the new constitution will solve the Kurdish issue is higher in rural areas than in urban ones; among residents of outer urban fringes than among residents of traditional households; and in clusters of lower income brackets than higher income groups.

Those who preferred stable economy obviously see economic demands as the priority problem, while both those preferring strong state and those preferring humanitarian society see the solution of the Kurdish issue as the more urgent issue.

Both the individuals who position themselves at the left and those who see themselves at the right consider the Kurdish issue the priority item, while people who position themselves at the center have primarily economic demands from the new constitution.

Both conservative nationalists’ and socialists’ highest expectation is that the Kurdish issue will be solved with the new constitution.

A large majority of BDP voters sees the Kurdish issue as the priority, and AK Party and MHP voters emphasize this issue more than CHP voters do. Those who expect solutions for economic problems with the new constitution are highest among CHP voters.

Individuals who voted “yes”, “not enough, but yes” in the 12 September referendum and who “boycotted” it consider the Kurdish issue a higher priority, while those who voted “no” rank highest the demand for solution to economic problems.

Analysis

Various structural or conjunctural “pressing” issues come to the fore on the agenda of social groups. Economic problems (income distribution, social justice etc.) and corresponding demands can be considered Turkey’s structural and ongoing issues. Therefore, it is understandable that the constitution, considered to be the “constitutive text of the society”, “the ultimate text”, is approached as an instrument that will pave the way for the solution of this fundamental issue, draw the framework in which political and social actors will evolve. As such, it is regarded as a source of hope.

It seems, however, regardless of how it is named (Kurdish question, Southeastern question, the problem of rights and freedoms, economic problem, terror problem etc.) and how it is proposed to be resolved (military means, democratic initiative, economic improvement etc.), the problem we call the “Kurdish issue” is the one item that most urgently awaits a solution. This is because the Kurdish issue has become a problem that has not only caused human suffering among nearly all segments of the society, but also an issue that has depleted social energy and economic resources. As it stands, the Kurdish issue creates a very strong sense of “insecurity” among social segments. There is thus hope that an effective future constitution that will “provide reconciliation to the extent possible” for society will also bring about a “consensus” with respect to the Kurdish issue and will therefore probably equip the society with “self-confidence”.


It is fair to say that the most significant finding of this survey is that there is an expectation that an ideal constitution will solve the Kurdish issue. However, considering the responses to questions that are directly related to this particular subject, there is no clear-cut opinion as to how the Kurdish issue will be solved. For instance, the general tendency in regards to education in one’s mother tongue and identity runs counter to Kurdish peoples demands.

The response to this question can be analyzed alongside the findings of the “Konda Barometer” study dated September 2012. According to that study, there is 35% support for destructive solutions (armed struggle etc.), while support for constructive solutions (rights based solutions etc.) is around 40%. Responses crystallize towards either end, and the gray area in between appears to have disappeared. The low level of support for the mother tongue and the extensive support for the emphasis on Turkish identity can be interpreted as a result of this polarization. At the same time, findings on confronting the past and rights and freedoms discussed in the forthcoming sections suggest that the society’s level of perception in regards to these issues has improved. The new constitutional process offers a significant potential for different groups to reach a consensus regarding the solution and enhance the scope of reconciliation.

3.3. WHAT SHOULD THE CONSTITUTION EMPHASIZE MOST?

Interviewees were asked “Which of the following two should the fundamental principles of the constitution be emphasized more in your opinion?”, and they were given the options “justice, equality, freedom, continuity of the state” and asked to choose two of these.

At 65.1%, the highest emphasis was on “justice against unfairness”, followed by “equality among all different segments such as Turk, Kurd, Sunni, Alevi” with 50.4%. Coming next is “freedom so that everyone can enjoy life without restrictions” with 35.6%, and “continuity of the state against all types of separation and destruction” at 33.6% respectively.



Looking at the distribution of results across religion/sect and ethnic origin, the emphasis on “justice” is more important for Turks, while for Kurds it is the emphasis on “equality”. Similarly, Sunnis consider the emphasis on “justice” more important, while Alevis find “equality” more pertinent.

For AK Party voters and MHP voters, the emphasis is on “justice” is quite significant. The emphasis on “equality” is more important for BDP and CHP voters than it is for the bases of other parties. Noteworthy is the high emphasis on the “continuity of the state” among MHP voters. The political clusters that emphasize “freedom” the most are the bases of BDP and CHP.

Individuals defining their political identity as conservative nationalist emphasize continuity of the state the most. Interestingly, those defining themselves as secular-nationalist follow the conservative nationalists in this regard.


Demand for justice is emphasized most by those who consider themselves conservative and Islamist.

The two political identity clusters with the highest emphasis on the demand for equality are socialists and secular-nationalists. Liberals, social democrats and socialists, however, emphasize freedom the most.


Considering it in terms of the designations left-right, it is the left-wingers who have the highest emphasis on equality. As one moves from the left to the right, the demand for justice comes to the fore.

Individuals whose fundamental preference is for a humanitarian society emphasize equality and freedom more. People who indicate a preference for a strong state and stable economy emphasize the continuity of the state more.

Graph 8: Which of the following fundamental principles of the constitution should be emphasized more? (%)



Graph 9: The preferred emphasis in constitutional principles as indicated according to the question of which would you prefer for the country



Analysis

This particular question concerns more concrete demands, as compared “Which of the following would you prefer for the country, if you needed to?” (3.1.), which rather solicited responses referring to “abstract” concepts (strong state, stable economy, humanitarian society). While the preference for a “strong state” was expressed relatively strongly in response to the former question, when specified, the emphasis on “continuity of the state against all kinds of separation and destruction” exhibits a decline in this question. A very significant segment of the society indicates that “justice against unfairness” (65%) and “freedom for all forms of difference such as Turk, Kurd, Sunni, Alevi” (50%) are issues the constitution must emphasize the most. In other words, although the idea of a “state” has a significant place in view of fears and insecurity, concrete demands of “justice” and “freedom” (“humanitarian society”) in the constitution are on the rise, and the “statist” approach weakens. A significant segment of those who preferred “strong state” in the previous question do not attribute the same importance to the “continuity of the state” when it comes to “justice”, and instead gives primacy to “justice”.


The strong state emerges as a somewhat habitual, guarded reference when we consider the relationship between the two questions. Those preferring the “strong state” if they need to in fact constitute a segment in which demand for the emphasis on “justice against unfairness” is at its highest. In a sense, this suggests that socially weak or under-confident actors seek the power to realize their aspirations in the state. Put differently, the fundamental issue that large swaths of the public concern themselves with is “justice”. Yet, concerned people are unable to express this transparently, and in keeping with the top-down statist mentality imposed thus far, they highlight concepts such as the “strong state” they were socialized and habituated into.

Respondents to this question who preferred the principle of “equality among all forms of difference such as Turk, Kurd, Sunni, Alevi” amount to 50.4%, which implies that there is prevalent acceptance of the pursuit for a pluralist principle of equality that encompasses all of the ethnic identities, which was previously difficult to even talk about.

3.4. DEVELOPMENT OR THE ENVIRONMENT?

Interviewees were read the sentence “Nature cannot be sacrificed for the sake of development” and asked to respond to it by choosing “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, “neither disagree nor agree”, “agree” or “strongly agree”.

68.9% of the respondents agreed with the sentence. 23.4% chose “strongly agree” and 45.5% “agree”, displaying an awareness of the environment. At 20.3% (made up of 4.7% who “strongly disagree” and 15.6% who “disagree”), some one-fifth of the society did not agree with the sentence.



The analysis of the findings shows that those with a preference for a humanitarian society have a more supportive attitude toward the environment than those favoring a strong state and stable economy.

Respondents who place themselves at the left and the center left have a more environmentalist attitude as compared to those who see themselves at the right and the center right.

Considering the range of political identities from conservative nationalists to socialists, environment-friendly attitude is lowest among conservative nationalists and rises as one moves toward socialists.

Liberals, social democrats and socialists constitute the political identity cluster with the highest sensitivity toward the environment.

CHP and BDP voters are more supportive of protecting the environment than AK Party and MHP voters are.

Kurds, as compared to Turks, and Alevis, as compared to Sunnis are more supportive of protecting the environment.

Analysis


Although the discourse bent on modernization and development, and thus economy and materiality, has become a noteworthy source of reference in society, a significant majority of the people perceive the environment and the nature as a significant asset. In other words, in parallel with the increasing environmental awareness around the globe, “environmentalism” is no longer a “luxurious” attitude in Turkey where the environment and rivers are rapidly polluting and agricultural fields are shrinking. Responses to this question, which points to an “environmental awareness”, reflect the anxiety generated by the modernist mentality that normalizes the practice of establishing absolute domination over nature. This anxiety offers an important hint as to the necessity that the environment should also enjoy constitutional and legal protection. In addition, it suggests that the environment, which cannot be brought back if it is harmed, should also “have rights”.

3.5. HOW SHOULD THE STATE MAKE PEACE WITH CERTAIN GROUPS?

Interviewees were asked to choose among “the state should apologize / the state should pay compensation / the state should both apologize and pay compensation / the state should neither apologize nor pay compensation” in response to “What should the state do respect to groups aggrieved by the state for various reasons in such incidences as Dersim, 6-7 September, Sivas Madımak, Uludere (Roboski)?”

13.5% of the interviewees responded “the state should apologize”, 10.2% “the state should pay compensation”, 45.2% “the state both apologize and pay compensation”, and 31.1% “the state should neither apologize nor pay compensation”.


Graph 11: What should the state do respect to groups aggrieved by the state for various reasons in such incidences as Dersim, 6-7 September, Sivas Madımak, Uludere (Roboski)?



While 73% of Kurds expected the state to both apologize and pay compensation, 41% of Turks expected that both steps be taken, while 35% of them wanted the state to do neither.

A similar differentiation is visible between Sunnis and Alevis, as well. 75% of Alevis wanted both steps to be taken, while 44% of Sunnis expected both steps to be taken and 32% of them expected neither.

Graph 12: What should the state do respect to groups aggrieved by the state for various reasons in such incidences as Dersim, 6-7 September, Sivas Madımak, Uludere (Roboski)?



86% of BDP voters said the state should take both actions. While respondents opposing both actions are in the MHP voter base, it should be noted that they form only 50% of that base. 50% of the MHP base supported an apology of some sort, compensation or both.

Roughly one-third of AK Party voter base and one-fifth of CHP voter base opposed both actions.

56% of conservative nationalists are against both actions, while 44% of them want a solution of some type. As one moves from conservative nationalists toward socialists, preference for “the state should neither apologize nor pay compensation” decreases. Similarly, that preference also goes down as one moves from the right to the left.

Analysis

Considering the findings as a whole, the following can be suggested at the outset: Not everyone has the same sensitivity or empathy toward the pains suffered by different social and cultural groups, and the level of this empathy varies with changing circumstances, legal framework, the discourse and struggles of the politicians, the state or the civil society. For instance, the massacres that took place in Dersim in 1938 could only be talked about among Kurdish / Alevi people (and to a limited extent therein) for nearly seventy years in what was a state of historical silence and forgetfulness, and they were not “known” or were ignored by broad segments of society. However, after Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan raised the issue in recent years, remarking that “if needed, an apology will be issued”, the silence surrounding it was broken, it became public, so apology and/or compensation became “normalized”. In other words, an apology was made in relation to this topic and similar ones, and “no hell broke loose” as a result.

Nevertheless, for the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities living in İstanbul, the 6-7 September incidents; for Alevis, the Sivas Madımak hotel fire; and more recently for Kurds, the Roboski incident are elements of traumatic memory. It would not be wrong to assume that the general public could not get the same information on these incidents and do not (could not) have the same level of empathy. However, despite the way the question is formulated, in other words, although there is a chance that “the different types of suffering put in and imposed as part of the same package” could be interpreted diversely, a very significant segment of the interviewees, 69%, acknowledges the pains “collectively”. This majority is aware that there are people out there who were harmed under the state’s watch. They display empathy toward pains “they may otherwise have not much empathy toward” and think that steps need to be taken to redress the material and/or spiritual losses of the aggrieved

Politicians’ populist concerns regarding the subject matter are disconfirmed by the fact that nearly two-thirds of the society wants that the state take a restorative and compensatory approach to these incidents. In addition, these percentages mean that any move by the state to make amends for these issues will be received positively by the large majority of the society. This points to an important theme to be focused on as part of making the new constitution.


4. On the Making of the New Constitution

4.1. HOW TO MAKE AN ACCEPTABLE CONSTITUTION?

Interviewees were asked “Under which conditions in which the new constitution is completed, will it be considered acceptable?” and given three options to choose from.

78.5% responded “if all segments of the society participate in and reach a consensus on the constitution”. 13.3% said “if the constitution rests upon a consensus among political parties”, and 8.2% answered “if it is made by the majority party in power”.

Graph 13: Under which conditions, in which the new constitution is completed, will it be considered acceptable? (%)



Without regard to political clusters such as party support, political identity or demographic or cultural clusters such as age, gender, a very large majority of the society considers the constitution acceptable if all segments of the society participate in the process and reach a consensus.


As compared to others, AK Party voters and those who voted “yes” in the referendum have a slightly higher preference for “if it is made the majority party in power”, however, even among these two groups, three-fourths support a constitution that the entire society participated in and reached a consensus on.

For BDP voters and those who “boycotted” the referendum, participation by the entire society and consensus are more pertinent than they are for the other groups.

4.2. HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE CURRENT PROGRESS ON THE MAKING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION?

When asked “Are you satisfied with the progress on the making of the constitution?”, 49.9% of the interviewees responded “no”, 33.1% said “partially”, and 17% answered “yes”. Half of society is not satisfied with the process.

Graph 14: Are you satisfied with the progress on the making of the constitution?



The dissatisfaction reaches 53% when it comes to those who preferred a constitution that the entire society participated in and reached a consensus on in response to the previous question.

While 44% of those who thought the majority party in power could make the constitution is satisfied with the process, 21% is not and 35% is partially satisfied.


Table 7: Are you satisfied with the progress on the making of the constitution?

What conditions should be satisfied for the new constitution to be considered acceptable?	No	Partially	Yes	Total
If it is made by the party in power	21	35	44	100
If it rests upon a consensus among political parties	47	36	16	100
If the entire society participates in and reaches a consensus	53	33	14	100

CHP voters are the most dissatisfied with the progress on the making of the constitution, followed by BDP voters. Even among AK Party voters (and those who voted “yes” in the referendum), one-third is not satisfied with the process.

Similarly, people who boycotted the 12 September referendum and who voted “no” have a high level of dissatisfaction in regards to the process.

Graph 15: Are you satisfied with the progress on the making of the constitution?




4.3. HOW SHOULD THE NEW CONSTITUTION COME INTO EFFECT?

Interviewees were asked “In your opinion, which of the following methods is more appropriate for the constitution to come into effect?” and given options to choose from.

Respondents who stated the need for approval in both the national assembly and the referendum amounted to 74%. 14.7% thought “An approval in a referendum is enough”, while 11.3% said an approval in the national assembly is enough.

Graph 16: Which of the following do you think is more appropriate method for the constitution to come into effect? (%)



Respondents who thought an approval in the national assembly is enough have a relatively higher percentage among AK Party voters and those who voted “yes / not enough but yes” in the referendum. However, respondents who opted for both an approval in a referendum and endorsement at the national assembly reach the highest percentage among CHP voters.

Considering the responses to “What conditions should be satisfied for the new constitution to be considered acceptable?” and “Are you satisfied with the progress on the making of the new constitution?” together, 42% of the sum total said that they both wanted a constitution that the entire society participated in and that the ongoing process was not in accord with that demand.

Adding to that the 25% who said they both wanted a constitution that the entire society participated in and that the ongoing process was partially satisfactory, the resultant 67% represents the segment that is not completely satisfied with the process.

Table 8: Are you satisfied with the progress on the making of the constitution? (%)

What conditions should be satisfied for the new constitution to be considered acceptable?	No	Partially	Yes	Total
If it is made by the party in power	2	3	4	9
If it rests upon a consensus among political parties	6	5	2	13
If the entire society participates in and reaches a consensus	42	25	11	78
	50	33	17	100

Considering the questions on how the new constitution should be made and how it should come into effect, three-fourths of the society;

- Thought that both participation of the entire society in the making of the constitution and a social consensus are necessary, and that a consensus must be reached at the national assembly and public approval must be sought in a referendum.
- Given this demand and requisite, there is a high degree of dissatisfaction with the ongoing process.

Analysis

Responses to who will make the constitution allow us to conclude that a significant segment of the public is unhappy with the polarizations thus far and aware that the polarizations stem from pro-coup mentalities that act with a “unilateral” approach and reflect that approach onto constitutions.

Even though everyone might desire a constitution that is in keeping with their own respective ideologies and one that follows that particular ideology, the analysis of the findings as a whole indicates that all segments of society submit that an all-encompassing and therefore “guarantee-providing”, “risk-reducing” and “confidence-inspiring” constitution is necessary, given the trials and tribulations that took place up to the present.

Looking at the political distribution of the respondents, the highest level of satisfaction is among voters of AK Party, the party currently in power; however, that level is not particularly high and voters of other parties are less satisfied.

The overall dissatisfaction might be due to the public being unable to obtain precise and clear-cut information regarding the process or the nature of the information available, in addition to the polarization in the society. It can also be observed that the optimistic or pessimistic attitudes adopted in news agencies people follow in line with their respective political preferences influence voters’ approaches. The constitutional monitoring TESEV has been conducting since October 2011 shows that newspapers close to AK Party focus on and accentuate the positive aspects of the process. Pessimism stands at the forefront in Kurdish press because the process has thus far not fared positively in terms of their democratic demands and expectations about those demands have been low. Newspapers CHP voters follow run stories reflecting the fear that the new constitution will lead to “separation” and it will be “AK Party’s constitution”.



5. The Fundamental Principles of the Constitution


Considering the questions on the fundamental principles of the constitution, the society expects the new constitution to be largely in harmony with international agreements and universal principles and make reference to these, while also affirming principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk.

Three-fourths (made up of 18.4% who “strongly agreed” and 56.5% who “agreed”) agreed with the proposition “The constitution should be in harmony with the international agreements Turkey is a party to and universal principles, and there should be no exceptions in this regard”.

In addition, more than four-fifths (made up of 28.5% who “strongly agreed” and 53.8% who “agreed”) of society approved of the proposition “The constitution should refer to principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk”

While more than two-thirds of the respondents opposed the proposition ““It is alright if Ankara were not the capital city”, one-fifth agreed with it.





Across different political stances and preferences or cultural identities, the proposition “the constitution should be in harmony with international agreements and universal principles, and there should be no exceptions in this regard” received the following responses:

- Respondents favoring a humanitarian society as compared to those favoring a strong state, and respondents identifying themselves as social democrat, liberal and democrat as compared to those identifying themselves differently approve of the proposition at a higher rate.
- Conservative nationalists and secular-nationalists are the political clusters that approve of this at the lowest rate.
- Respondents whose political preference is for CHP and AK Party, and Kurds and Alevis are more strongly supportive of the proposition than others.


The proposition “The Constitution should refer to the principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk” received the following responses:

- Proponents of a strong state, people who see themselves at the center left approve of this at a higher rate.
- Atatürkists, secular-nationalists and conservative nationalists “agree” with it more than others do.
- CHP voters and MHP voters “agree” with it more than others do.
- Respondents who voted no in the referendum “agree” with it more than others do.
- As compared with Kurds, the Turks, and as compared with Sunnis, the Alevis are more strongly supportive of this proposition.


The proposition “It is alright if Ankara were not the capital city” has received the following responses:

- Supporters of a strong state and stable economy oppose it more than others do.
- Respondents who see themselves at the center left oppose it more than others do.
- Secular-nationalists and nationalists oppose it more than others do.
- MHP voters and CHP voters oppose it more than others do.


Graph 20: The constitution should be in harmony with the international agreements Turkey is a party to and universal principles, and there should be no exceptions in this regard. (%)



Graph 21: The constitution should refer to the principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk. (%)



Graph 22: It is alright if Ankara were not the capital city. (%)



Analysis

Respondents' understanding of "international and universal norms" and "Atatürkism" does not emerge clearly in the study. People might have the general opinion that the nationalism of Atatürk, on the grounds that it is a "progressive" perspective, is an ideology compatible with international/universal norms. A large segment of society does not oppose propositions that might be filled with "positive" content ("referring to the nationalism of Atatürk in the constitution"), as long as those propositions do not bear highly serious problems.

Nevertheless, multiple undemocratic decisions were issued by the judiciary in the post-1982 era relying on this particular reference from the 1982 Constitution, as well as the statements in its preamble. The preference of those individuals (i.e. Kurds and BDP voters) who responded "disagree" to the question on the inclusion of principles and reforms and the nationalism of Atatürk in the new constitution is a manifestation of this specific reality in Turkey.

Considering the views expressed in relation to the fundamental principles of the constitution with the responses to the previous questions, it can be concluded that although the society seeks social, political and legal change, it does not want the change to take place in a very radical manner. First of all, a significant segment of the respondents demands constitutional harmony with universal principles, that is, expresses that Turkey has no "special" position as claimed by the nationalist and protectionist rhetoric. But similarly, wide social segments do not seek clash and rupture and instead look for smooth transitions. Both when they agree with having a reference to the nationalism of Atatürk and when they oppose the proposition "It is alright if Ankara were not the capital city", they show that they definitely remain distant toward these radical and risky transformations.


The impression left by the findings up to this point suggests that there are three main tendencies in the society that sometimes intersect, at other times diverge, and can even be encountered in the same individual.

In addition to these findings that provide a sense of the characteristics of the general public, one can consider the cluster study performed on the basis the statistical analysis and discussed under "Clustering Analysis" (see page 97) at the end of this report.

6. Language

6.1. OFFICIAL LANGUAGE

When asked “What should be the official language of the country?”, 85% responded “Turkish only”, while 15% said “In addition to Turkish, all languages spoken in the country can be an official language”.



Analyzing the findings:

Those in favor of a humanitarian society have a higher rate of support for other languages also being official languages.


As one moves from the left to the right across the political spectrum, support for other languages decreases.

Socialists, democrats and social democrats, as well as Islamists have higher rates of support for other languages being official, while the lowest support is among conservative nationalists and secular-nationalists.

A very large majority of BDP voters lean towards other languages also being official, and AK Party voters approve of this idea more than CHP and MHP voters do.

Two-thirds of Kurds demand that languages in addition to Turkish should also be official.


Graph 24: In addition to Turkish, all languages spoken in the country can be an official language. (%)



6.2. ENJOYING LIFE IN ONE’S MOTHER TONGUE

6.2.1. The language of education

When asked “Which should be the language of formal education?”, 73% responded “Turkish only” and 27% said “In addition to Turkish, anyone can receive education in the language they acquired from their parents and they speak”.



Analyzed across demographic and political clusters, there are clusters that hold opposing views with respect to education in one’s mother tongue. The most divergent views are held by Turks on the one side and Kurds on the other, and by BDP voters on the one side and voters of other parties, in particular those of MHP, on the other.

While 80% of Turks responded “Turkish only”, 78% of Kurds answered “education in other languages spoken, in addition to Turkish”. These contesting views resemble the responses to the question on official language: While 9% of Turks supported languages in addition to Turkish being an official language, 64% of Kurds maintained this proposition.


While support across Turkey for education in one’s mother tongue is 27%, the rate is 94% among BDP voters. BDP voters’ take on this issue is very clear. Voters of other parties who support the idea of education in one’s mother tongue remain at a rate below average: 25% of AK Party voters, 19% of CHP voters, and 11% of MHP voters, which amount to less than 50%.

Considering political identities especially democrats, social democrats, and partly Islamists favor the proposition.

43% of Alevis supported the view that one can receive education in one’s mother tongue.

There is a higher rate of support for education in one’s mother tongue among those with up to high school education. High school graduates are less supportive of this as compared with both the less educated and those with a university degree.


As income level rises, so does the rate of those who argue that education must be in Turkish language only.



Considering the questions “What should be the official language?” and “what should be the language of education?” together, 70.9% of the respondents asserted “Turkish should be both the official language and the language of education”. Those who responded “Turkish should be the official language, but education can be in other languages” amount to 14.2%, and 14.9% maintained “other languages can be both official language and a language of education”.

6.2.2. Use of Mother Tongue in Local Governments

In response to “Elected local governments should be able to have authority in regards to education and public services in people’s mother tongues or in the language spoken by the local people”, the respondents at first sight appear to be undecided or split evenly. While 40% agreed with this idea, 45% did not.





However, differences of opinion become most manifest in line with political preferences, as is the case with respect to legislating additional taxes discussed in the forthcoming section. 87% of BDP voters approved of local governments having authority in relation to mother tongue, while only 30% of MHP voters did so. 56% of MHP voters opposed this idea. While the percentage of AK Party voters who supported the idea is close to the national percentage, CHP voters’ attitude most closely resembles that of MHP voters: 52% of them disagreed with the idea.

73% of Kurds and 35% of Turks responded that local governments should have authority in regards to mother tongue.

While not as striking as political preference and ethnic origin, demographic properties offer the following findings in regards to the use of mother tongue in local governments:

- As the level of education and income increases, opposition to this proposition rises.
- Men have a higher rate of disagreement than women.
- Alevis support the idea at a rate about 10 points higher than the national percentage.
- Rural dwellers opposed the idea of authorizing local governments as such at a rate of 52%. Urban and metropolitan dwellers do not display an attitude diverging from the national percentage.



Based on a cross tabulation of these findings, 34% of those who agreed that Turkish should be the only official language supported the use of different languages locally.

Analysis

Questions on language need to be analyzed collectively. While respondents who want Turkish to be the only official language and the language of education in the country are in the majority, there is more support for authorizing elected local governments for the provision of educational and public services in languages spoken locally. Once it is no longer politicized and becomes a matter of everyday life, and when specific practices are at stake, the recognition of the right to enjoy life in one's mother tongue finds acceptance.

The questions on language offer important insights. First of all, at the root of the concern regarding education in one's mother tongue is the noteworthy issue of "trust-lack of trust" mentioned previously. The topic of mother tongue receives a reaction similar to that against the headscarf in the past. In other words, the fear voiced in the words "if we allow headscarf on university campuses now, they will later want to serve as teachers, judges wearing their headscarves in the public sector" finds an echo in "if we allow education in mother tongue now, they will later ask their mother tongue to be an official language and seek independence". Looking at the survey results, we note that the similar concern in the case of the headscarf has been appeased (See 8.6.).

While there are various reasons for these fears, starting with the way political culture began taking shape a century ago, there is, on the one hand, a strong demand for democratization (humanitarian society, justice, equality, freedom etc.), but there is also a fear that keeps resurfacing due most importantly to the Kurdish issue. Although there is faith that the constitution may be a panacea to the Kurdish issue, the concern regarding this issue is also heightened. It is as if fears around the Kurdish issue are blocking society's potential for democratization.

Nevertheless, we encounter interesting data when we consider which of the different segments in society feels this fear the most. Although there is a recognition that rights and freedoms are necessary, the tutelary perspective is seen to have spread to different social segments. Therefore, while these segments keep chanting "rights and freedoms are good" habitually, this is immediately followed by another habitual expression to the tune of "right now there is terror, we face risks". For instance, classes with lower levels of income and education are more tolerant toward education in mother tongue, while the level of tolerance decreases in high-income groups, which corresponds to a class-based fear. Similarly, CHP and MHP bases, where the "statist hardcore" finds more representation than among the AK Party base, express this language of fear more.

However, at this point we can refer to another finding that emerged in the previous sections. It is noteworthy that people who call themselves "Islamist" are among those representing the changing face of the society. They agree with the right to education in mother tongue and do not fear this. By extension they demand a more democratic and civilian constitution, alongside individuals who identify as "democrat" or "socialist". Put differently, the democracy vs. tutelage polarization in Turkish society has gone beyond the divergences "left-right", "religious-*laïc*", and it has moved away from the segments polarized into two separate camps. One can say there is now a different type of polarization: On the one side, there are "democrats" from any origin, and on the other, there are "authoritarians" from any background. One also definitely needs to add that labels such as socialist, democrat, Islamist are not fixed and their meanings and contents have shifted from what they were in the '70s or in the 28 February era.

7. Laïcité

The study included six questions about the place of laïcité in the new constitution, and one of them inquired into whether or not laïcité should remain in the constitution; three into the status and function of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, and two were about the course on religion and ethics.


Responses to the question on laïcité expose the difference of opinion among various segments to a certain extent; however, the divergence becomes marked when it comes to the responses on the Presidency and the religion course. Political preferences are the most important factor driving the difference of opinion in the case of laïcité. Party preference, the attitude in the referendum, or political identification or left-right tendencies lead to more pronounced variation than demographic characteristics.

The fact that otherwise different social segments share views along the same lines even though they remain divergent with respect to certain issues implies that certain areas relating to laïcité can each serve as a ground for consensus.

7.1. SHOULD LAÏCITÉ REMAIN IN THE CONSTITUTION?


When asked about their opinion on *laïcité*, half of the people believed it should stay as-is in the constitution and two-fifths said it should remain but “it should be redefined in a way in which the state would maintain equal distance to all religions”. One in every ten held the view that the concept should be removed from the constitution.

Graph 30: Which of the following opinions do you agree with regarding laïcité? (%)



Considering this particular subject, it is noteworthy that Kurds, BDP voters, those who self-identify as democrats, and in particular Alevis emphasize the notion of equal distance. Respondents who emphasize that laïcité should remain in the constitution more than others do are CHP voters and MHP voters, those who responded “no” in the referendum and those who identify as Atatürkist. There is a third group, the conservatives and Islamists, who argue, at a rate twice the national percentage, that laïcité should be removed altogether from the constitution.

Graph 31: Which of the following opinions do you agree with regarding laïcité? (%)



Kurds and BDP voters emphasize both the notion of equal distance and the removal of laïcité from the constitution more prevalently than others. While more Alevis (58%) support equal distance, they do not demand that laïcité be removed. In fact, 66% of the interviewees in this study who identified their religion/sect as Alevi also chose to define themselves as Atatürkist.

51% across Turkey responded that “laïcité should remain as-is in the constitution”, while there was up to 60% support for that statement among CHP and MHP voters, those who responded “no” in the referendum, as well as those who identify as Atatürkist. Across the right-left axis, the percentage that offered the same response increased incrementally from 47% on the right to 54% on the left. Agreement with “Laïcité should be removed from the constitution” dropped from 12% on the right to 6% on the left.

The level of education, a factor that otherwise assumes an explanatory role in several other areas, is seen to have no impact on the view on laïcité. Demographic characteristics such as age, gender and income level do not carry a determining effect either.

While different segments hold various opinions in regards to the place of laïcité in the constitution, the Presidency of Religious Affairs and the religion course; topics that are the everyday manifestations of laïcité further accentuate differences.


7.2. THE STATUS AND FUNCTION OF THE PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

The Presidency of Religious Affairs is one of the main topics of the laïcité debate in Turkey, and interviewees were asked questions along the following lines in that regard: Should the Presidency have a place in the new constitution or not? If yes, should it serve only the Sunnis or all other religions and sects? If no, should it continue as an independent entity or be abolished altogether?

It is fair to say that a large majority of the respondents had a clear attitude toward all three areas: This majority believed that the Presidency of Religious Affairs should have a place in the constitution; if it will continue to have a place in the constitution, it should be serving all religions and sects; and if it is removed from the constitution, it should then continue as an entity independent from the state and the government.

7.2.1. Should the Presidency of Religious Affairs be referenced in the New Constitution?

Graph 32: Should the Presidency of Religious Affairs continue be preserved in the new constitution, or should it not? (%)



The view that the Presidency of Religious Affairs should stay as-is in the constitution is quite widespread. Considering who supported the idea that the Presidency should be removed from the constitution in comparison with the public in general, the differing views will be better laid out:

Although political preferences and identities come to the fore, 54% of Alevis, who are the first group that comes to mind when the Presidency is being debated and participates most extensively in these debates, responded that the Presidency should be removed from the constitution. They thus express themselves as the cluster that is most opposed to the current provision. When it comes to CHP voters, 32% did not want that institution to have a place in the constitution. While one can mistakenly assume at first sight that this high percentage among CHP voters is due only to the Alevis who are part of CHP voter base, it is useful remember the following: Some 70% of those who self-identify as Alevis are CHP voters, but they constitute one-fourth of the CHP voter base.

The political data on political preferences and identities affect the perspective toward this question; however, nowhere does the pendulum ever swing to the point where the majority argues that “The Presidency of Religious Affairs should be abolished”. The most obvious difference emerges in terms of where interviewees position themselves along the right-left axis. 93% of those who saw themselves at the far right and 62% of those who saw themselves at the far left support the view that the institution must have a place in the constitution.

Respondents who identified themselves as conservative nationalist, conservative, Islamist and nationalist support this view at a rate 5-10 points higher than the general public, while democrats, Atatürkists and in particular social democrats (62%) are less supportive of it.

23% of Kurds and BDP voters responded that the Presidency should be removed from the constitution. The level of education also influences with this view: As the level of education increases, so does the percentage of support for the removal, reaching up to twice the Turkey-wide percentage among university graduates. Although it was not a question in this particular study, according to findings of other KONDA studies, the connection with religiosity weakens as the level of education goes up.

7.2.2. Who Should the Presidency of Religious Affairs Serve?

The society had a clear preference as to whether it is only the Sunnis or members of other religions and sects in addition to Sunnis should be served by the Presidency, if it is to remain in existence: 84% of the public supported that the institution should serve all. With varying rates, all segments of the society agreed on this view.

Graph 33: If it is to be preserved, what should be the scope of service of the Presidency of Religious Affairs? (%)



Even among Sunni Muslims who could be expected to most oppose this view, the support decreases only by 1 point. AK Party and MHP voters (at rates around 80%) and those who self-identify as conservative nationalist, conservative and Islamist (around 75%) argue, at lower percentages, for the view that the Presidency should serve all.

CHP and especially BDP voters, and those who voted “no” in the referendum and boycotted it oppose, at high rates, the view that it should serve the Sunnis only.


As the level of education rises and as one moves from the right to the left, the idea that it should serve all gains further ground.

As with their attitude regarding whether the Presidency should have a place in the constitution, Alevis have the most unequivocal and clear-cut attitude regarding this issue: 99% of Alevis argued that if it is to be preserved, the Presidency of Religious Affairs should include representatives of other sects and religions in addition to Sunnis.

7.2.3. Should the Presidency of Religious Affairs be Abolished, or Should It Become Independent?

Interviewees were asked to evaluate the likelihood that the Presidency of Religious Affairs could be abolished, in addition to the likelihood that it might be maintained in the constitution. In response to “If the Presidency of Religious Affairs is not to be preserved in the constitution, which of the following is more proper option for religious affairs? (%)”, the majority (78%) preferred “It should become an entity independent from the state and governments”. The rest (21.9%) responded that “It should be totally abolished, and every religious and confessional group administer their own religious services by their own means”.

Graph 34: If the Presidency of Religious Affairs is not to be preserved in the constitution, which of the following is more proper option for religious affairs? (%)



Considering this topic in light of available social identities as well as the responses to the other questions relating to the Presidency, one can say the opinions expressed are not surprising. Although no segment of the society supported abolishing the institution more prevalently than it wanted to maintain it as an independent entity, the idea that it should be abolished and different religious groups should handle their respective affairs with their own means is one that receives more support from certain groups as expected: Two-fifths of Alevis, one-third of Kurds, one-third of CHP voters, nearly half of BDP voters, one-fourth of those who responded “no” in the referendum, two-fifths of those who boycotted the referendum, one-third of those who self-identified as democrat, social democrat or Atatürkist, and one-third of those who saw themselves on the left.

Those who expressed more support for the institution becoming an independent entity did so at percentages that are not much higher than that of the general public: AK Party voters, MHP voters, conservative nationalists, nationalists, conservatives, Islamists, and those who saw themselves on the right. While respondents who identified themselves as Islamist have percentages close to the national average, 91% of those who self-identified as conservative preferred the institution becoming an independent entity over it being abolished completely, and they noticeably diverged from the averages as such.

Given the differences in percentages, it could be argued that a discussion concerning who the Presidency of Religious Affairs should serve and its independence should aid consensus and the creation of a constructive common ground better than a discussion on abolishing it altogether.

Graph 35: If the Presidency of Religious Affairs is not to be preserved in the constitution, which of the following is more proper option for religious affairs? (%)




Table 9				
The Presidency should be maintained in the new constitution.	Scope of service if the Presidency is preserved (%)	Handling religious affairs should the Presidency have no place in the constitution		Total (%)
		The Presidency should become an entity independent from the state / government (%)	It should be totally abolished, and every religious and confessional group administer their own religious services by their own means	
Yes	Sunnis only	12.1	2.0	14.1
	Members of other sects / religions also	58.5	12.2	70.7
No	Sunnis only	0.9	0.7	1.6
	Members of other sects / religions also	6.6	7.1	13.6
Total (%)		78.1	21.9	100.0


Analyzing the responses to the three questions together, following opinions prevail in society in regards to the Presidency of Religious Affairs:

- **71.4%** responded that it should stay as-is in the constitution, but serve not only the Sunnis but also the rest;
- **69.2%** responded that it should stay as-is in the constitution, but become an entity independent from the state and the government;
- **62.5%** responded that it should continue as an independent entity and serve all;
- **58.5%** responded that it should be referred to in the constitution, become independent and serve all. This is a percentage that indicates a little over half of the society is in agreement on the same formula.

7.3. THE RELIGION AND ETHICS COURSE

7.3.1. Mandatory? Elective? Or should it be abolished?

The society is split into two with respect to the courses on religion and ethics. While 3.6% thought these courses should be eliminated altogether, 50.1% would like these to be mandatory and 46.3% wanted them as elective.




Respondents who would like these courses to be mandatory have the highest percentage among AK Party voters (64.5%). They are followed by MHP voters and BDP voters. Those wishing to see them as elective courses have the highest percentage among CHP voters (64.9%).

In terms of political identities, individuals who identified themselves as Islamist include the highest percentage of respondents wanting to have these as mandatory courses. They are followed by conservatives, conservative nationalists and nationalists respectively.


At 67.4%, secular-nationalists have the highest percentage of individuals who would like to see these as elective courses. They are followed by social democrats, liberals and Atatürkists.

70.1% of Alevi would prefer them to be elective, while 16.5% of them preferred that they be eliminated altogether.



7.3.2. What content should the course entail?

In response to “If the religion and ethics course were to continue as-is, what should its content be?”, three-fourths of the respondents (76.9%) said “In addition to Sunni Islam, there should be a curriculum on all other religions and sects”. 23.1% responded “There should be a curriculum on Sunni Islam”.



As would be expected, 93.8% of Alevis would like the course to cover all religions and sects.

95.2% of BDP voters, 88.5% of CHP voters, 71.6% of AK Party voters, and 70.3% of MHP voters would like it to cover all religions.

In terms of political identities, about one-third of Islamists and conservatives responded “There should be a curriculum on Sunni Islam”, while two-thirds said there should be coverage of all religions.

At 95%, liberals and socialists have the highest percentage of respondents who wanted coverage of all religions, followed by social democrats, secular-nationalists and democrats.

Analysis

The religion- laïcité axis, the presidency of religious affairs, and religion courses in schools can be considered among “hot button” issues in Turkey. Undoubtedly, in quantitative studies, rates that represent the “majority” stand out more, and it is these percentages that must be emphasized first. Nevertheless, among the varying responses to these questions and their respective percentages is a noticeable one that does not represent a “majority”: Of the responses to “Which of the following opinions do you agree with regarding laïcité?”, the response with wider acceptance; at 50%, was “laïcité should remain as-is in the constitution”; however, the response of 41% of interviewees that “laïcité should have a place in the constitution, but it should be redefined in a way in which the state would maintain equal distance to all religions” represents a very serious demand for change.

Corroborating previous findings, this demand for “change” is complemented by a demand for “continuity”, and what ensues is an outcome that does not have a radical character. In other words, the opinion “The Presidency of Religious Affairs should continue to have a place in the constitution, however, it needs to make room for members of other religions and sects in addition to Sunnis”, expressed by a large majority - well over 80%, of the society- represents just this demand for “non-radical change”. This perspective can be schematized as “Let there be a course on religion, but it should offer content on all religions and sects”, “Let there be room for Atatürk/ laïcité, but let there be room for pluralism as well”, “Let the Presidency of Religious Affairs continue to exist, but let it have a pluralist make-up”.

The 58.5% of the general public which supports the view “there should both be room for the Presidency of Religious Affairs in the constitution and the Presidency should become an independent entity and serve all” constitutes a very significant segment seeking a “trouble and hassle-free” transition. Similarly, this is a group that, while demanding change, wants to have it not through a costly and risky path but via a “rational” route; taking, in a sense, a lesson from the past and thus moving in a spirit of “may there be no polarization and let there be consensus”.

To infer an interim conclusion at this point, one could offer the following in relation to the general sentiment represented by the public average in relation to matters of “freedom”: The “for laïcité - anti- laïcité” tension and the perceptions of “threat” in that regard are left behind for the most part. The demand for pluralism is on the rise when no threat is perceived in this and similar situations, and accordingly, when pluralism gets established and normalized, the element of threat disappears.


8. Rights and Citizenship

Questions on citizens' rights and the role of the state in protecting those rights dealt with topics such as identity, discrimination, and wearing the headscarf.

8.1. DEFINING IDENTITIES IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION

When asked about how identities should be defined in the constitution, 56% of respondents thought that the constitution should, as it currently does, only refer to the Turkish identity. One-third said “all ethnic identities must be referred to”. 9% answered that no identity should be referenced in the constitution.


Graph 39: There is much debate about identities in the constitution, which of the following sentences do you agree with? (%)



In terms of voter preferences, 88% of BDP voters responded “all identities should be included”. CHP voters do not differ from the national percentage, but AK Party voters and MHP voters are slightly more supportive of “Turkish identity only”, with their respective percentages at 62 and 70 percent. In any case, it is necessary to note that even among MHP voters, 25% responded that “all ethnic identities should be included”.

Difference in terms of political identification can especially be traced across the percentages of the “Turkish identity only” response. 81% of conservative nationalists, 65% of nationalists, 59% of both conservatives and *Atatürkists* offered that response, while 34% of democrats and 38% of social democrats responded as such. Noticeably, 18% of democrats responded “no identity should be included”, and that percentage is twice the national average.

Graph 40: There is much debate about identities in the constitution, which of the following sentences do you agree with? (%)



In terms of demographic characteristics, the results are as follows:


As the level of education increases, the percentage of interviewees responding “Turkish identity only” decreases, that of those responding “no identity at all” goes up, and that of “room for all identities” remains constant.

It can be concluded that Turks and Kurds have opposing views on the issue. 72% of Kurds said all identities should be included”. The percentage of Kurds who responded “no identities at all” is 4 points above national average. 61% of Turks answered “Turkish identity only” and 30% of Turks, which is 5 points less than national average, responded “all identities should be included”.

For Alevis, diversity is important: 57% of them preferred “all identities should be included”.

In sum, while it could be said there is consensus that the constitution must refer to identity, it is seen that there could be significant controversy among the public as to which identity or identities.

Graph 41: There is much debate about identities in the constitution, which of the following sentences do you agree with? (%)




Analysis

One of the noticeable results under the “Rights and Citizenship” subheading concerns the definition of an identity in the constitution. It turns out that “Turkishness”, just like “Muslimness”, is a type of belonging that comes with a guarantee. Or, as a result of the practices of a nation-state spanning at least a century, Turkishness has become “naturalized”. However, the fact that this particular identity was imposed did not lead to other ethnic identities being assimilated completely. In an inverse vicious cycle, that imposition transformed other identities into ones that were not forsaken, but rather politicized. As a result ruptures ensued. In turn, the different ethnic identities mounting resistance provoked “Turkishness” once again, resulting in Turkishness gaining parallel ground alongside other identities. Put differently, there is a “rupture”: On the one side of this rupture, there is an emphasis on Turkishness that represents or renders visible the “former”, the “fear”; on the other side, there is the 44% demanding that the constitution either make no reference to any ethnic identity at all or refer to all ethnic identities, in response to the negative consequences created by the very Turkishness emphasized as such.

8.2. THE NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE


70% of interviewees agreed that “The state should remain neutral toward all freedoms and personal choices including the headscarf, sexual orientation, or whatever the preferences may be”. Across different demographics and political preferences, the agreement varies from 60% to 80%, and there are no clusters with very divergent views.



At 77% and 76% respectively, Alevis and CHP voters are the groups that agree most with the idea that the state should remain neutral. In terms of political identification, Islamists and democrats agree with it less, while social democrats agree with it more than others do. Ethnic origin does not result in any difference.


As income and education levels increase, the percentage of those in agreement with this statement does not change much, but the percentage of people who respond with “strongly agree” goes up.

Graph 43: The state should remain neutral toward all freedoms and personal choices including the headscarf, sexual orientation, or whatever the preferences may be. (%)



8.3. PROTECTION FROM DISCRIMINATION


It can be said that all segments of the society agree the state has an obligation to protect its citizens from discrimination. 92% of interviewees “agree” or “strongly agree” with the following statement: “The state has an obligation to protect its citizens from discrimination and harassment they might suffer because of their preferences.”



The only cluster whose rate of agreement with this statement is noticeably different from the national average is BDP voters: 86% of them agreed with the view, at a rate below the national average. This might be considered unexpected at first sight. It might be that BDP voters actually do not agree with the statement as much as the national average. But they might have had an alternative understanding of the statement, where they thought the state currently does not fulfill this obligation, or they do not see that obligation associated with the state. It is not possible to ascertain which one is the case on the basis of the study findings.


While the rate of those who are in agreement with the statement among various income and education levels does not vary, as in the responses to some of the other questions, the percentage of people who expressed their opinion with “strongly agree” varies.

Graph 45: The state has an obligation to protect its citizens from discrimination and harassment they might face because of their preferences. (%)



8.4. GROUPS' IDENTITY RIGHTS

"It is necessary to recognize citizens' freedoms to sustain the group, cultural identity or the community to which they belong" is a statement 72% of interviewees agreed with. While percentages vary across all demographic and political clusters, affirmation of this statement always prevails over disagreement, and therefore this is seen to be a topic that does not entail much difference of opinion or polarization.



The analysis brings the following issues to the fore:


68% of Atatürkists, 64% of social democrats and 60% of those who see themselves on the left politically agree with the necessity to recognize groups' freedom to sustain their identities. In the case of especially social democrats and others on the left, this represents a stance that contradicts the attitudes they adopt in regards to other areas. It may be assumed that this is due to the word "community" in the statement, and people in those clusters interpret "community" as "religious community", as a result of which they support the statement to a lesser degree.

Alevis agreed with the statement at 63%, a relatively low rate. . Even though they are a group that fits the definition of cultural identity, community referred to in the statement, it is not known why they support it at a lower rate.

The percentage of CHP voters agreeing with it is 5 points less than that of Alevis, while that of MHP voters is 7 points less than that. When it comes to AK Party voters, agreement is at 5 points higher.


Turks agree with the statement at the same percentage as the general public. Kurds agree with it at 4 points more than the general public does.

Graph 47: It is necessary to recognize citizens' freedoms to sustain the group, cultural identity or the community to which they belong. (%)



8.5. STATE INTERVENTION IN INTRAGROUP PRESSURE

Another statement relating to group rights concerned the rights of citizens who suffered pressure within the cultural group to which they belonged. When asked whether or not the state should intervene in the case of such pressure, 85% of interviewees believed that it should.



While all clusters generally agree with the statement, there are some noteworthy differences in percentages:

At 92%, conservative nationalists approve the intervention by the state in intragroup pressures at the highest rate.

As compared to the general public, Alevis, at 89%, agree with it more than the general public does.

At 71%, BDP voters are the cluster least supportive of state intervention.


Kurds, like BDP voters, have a relatively lower rate of agreement: about 76%.

At 80%, respondents who self-identified as Islamist are also slightly less supportive of the statement.

The right-left axis does not create any variation.

As income and education levels go up, agreement with state intervention in pressures increases slightly.

Graph 49: The state should be able to intervene to protect its citizens against the pressure they may expose from group, cultural identity or community to which they belong. (%)



Analysis


In the sections above where cultural identities are discussed, “pro-freedom” attitudes stand out among three-fourths of the general public, as is the case with respect to the question of the headscarf dealt with below. In other words, although the word “community” is juxtaposed with “cultural group” in the question, and it remains a term that has caused some allergic reaction among the “laïc-left-Atatürkist” circles, it has been submitted that social life is not possible through only a “citizenship” link, and there are “cultural worlds of meaning” people inhabit as their “home” of sorts and to which they belong, and that these worlds deserve respect.

However, the question on cultural groups is followed by another inquiry about the potential pressure these groups and communities may exert among themselves, which received a response along the lines that the state should protect the individuals in such groups. This response offers a very important hint as to the relations among “state-society-cultural identity-individual”. Instead of the logic of “multiculturalism” including distinct groups each of which carries a ghettoization potential a significant majority of interviewees support, not theoretically but in a practical sense, the logic of “interculturalism”. In this logic, people who are attached to a particular cultural identity are not confined by that identity; they are also equal citizens or individuals enjoying the protection provided by a “trustworthy state”. The demand arising as a result is for both “free community” (or cultural group) and “free individuals”.

8.6. WEARING THE HEADSCARF

While the previous three questions inquired more into general principles, the question on the headscarf treats the subject matter through an oft-debated and politicized example in Turkey. Three out of every four interviewees (76%) agree that “any person who wishes to wear the headscarf should be able to do so, including public employees such as teachers and judges”.

Graph 50: Any person who wishes to wear the headscarf should be able to do so, including public employees such teachers and judges. (%)



Even though agreement with this statement does not fall below 50% in different demographic and political clusters with the exception of one or two, some variations in percentages stand out because of the different perspectives they reflect.

Among CHP voters, there is considerable opposition to the idea that anyone should be free to wear the headscarf: Only 48%, that is less than half, responded “Anyone is free to do so”. 38% of CHP voters said “Not everyone is free to wear the headscarf”. 89% of AK Party voters answered “Anyone is free to do so”. The respective opinions of MHP voters and BDP voters do not differ from that of the general public.

54% of those who cast a “no” and 88% of those who voted “yes” in the referendum support the view that anyone is free to put on the headscarf.


Opposition is on the rise as the level of education and income increases. Agreement with “anyone is free to do so” drops to 62% among university graduates. One in every four university graduate responded “no, not everyone is free to do so”.

The right-left axis and political identities have a noticeable impact upon agreement with the view. While 87% of those on the right agree with it, the rate drops to 54% on the left. It goes down to 45% among individuals who saw themselves on the center left.

Half of Alevi support the right to wear the headscarf: 53% of agreed with the practice, while one-third (35%) opposed it.

82% of Kurds responded that anyone who wishes to wear the headscarf should be free to do so.

In terms of political identification, support for the freedom to wear the headscarf drops to around 60% among Atatürkists and social democrats. In contrast, 90% of Islamists and 85% of conservatives support it, as do 81% of nationalists and 80% of conservative nationalists.




Analysis

We could assert that one result that stands out has to do with the issue of “wearing the headscarf”. It is highly likely that the headscarf is no longer perceived as a cause of crisis because of the “trouble-free” condition experienced after students wearing the headscarf were allowed on university campuses in practice. This experience went a step further and reached a level of flexibility making room for public employees who wanted to wear the headscarf. In other words, the headscarf problem was left behind in spite of the current opposition to AK Party, and the actualities of everyday life prevailed over politics.

9. The Restriction of Rights

9.1. RESTRICTION OF RIGHTS DUE TO VIOLENCE

82% of the people agreed that rights and freedoms can be restricted if they are exercised for violent and hateful purposes.




Only 46% BDP voters agreed with this view, while 28% of them opposed it. Agreement stays at the same percentage in the case of other political parties, but the percentage of those who “strongly agree” with the statement increases as one moves from AK Party voters to CHP voters to MHP voters.

- 67% of Kurds agreed that rights may be restricted, while 17% of them disagreed with it.
- There is no significant, remarkable variation in the opinions across political identities or the right-left axis.
- There is a 5 point difference between Sunnis and Alevis, with the former agreeing with the statement at a higher percentage.
- There is a 7 point difference between respondents with below high school education and those with university graduates, and agreement is on the rise as the level of education goes up.

9.2. RESTRICTING RIGHTS ON THE BASIS OF PUBLIC MORALITY

The 82% agreement with restriction of rights when they are exercised for violent and hateful purposes drops to 69% when restriction is based on public morality.



Agreement among high school and university graduates with restriction for purposes of public morality is 3 points less than that among the general public.

Agreement with restricting rights for moral purposes increases as age goes up. 67% of the 18-28 age group, 68% of the 29-43 age group, and 71% of 44 and above age group are in favor of restriction. While there is no major difference between the percentages, the variation is noteworthy because this is one of the rare questions that can be correlated with age.

There is a general decrease in the agreement with restriction as income level goes up, however, one cannot observe an incremental and steady drop across income brackets.

58% of Kurds and 51% of Alevis responded “yes, rights and freedoms can be restricted when morality is at stake”. Half of Alevis opposed the restriction, which can be interpreted as a matter of sensitivity on their part, considering that Alevis live side by side the numerical majority, the Sunnis.

62% of CHP voters agreed with the restriction of rights, while 40% of BDP voters did so. The respective percentages of AK Party voters and MHP voters are the same as that of the general public.

While there is only a maximum of 10 point difference, the respective percentages of democrats, Atatürkists and social democrats who responded “rights can be restricted for moral purposes” are 4 to 6 points less than those of conservative nationalists, nationalists, conservatives and Islamists who gave that response.

Respondents who are in favor of “restriction” go up from 56% to 79% as one moves from the left to the right along the right-left axis.


This particular question was immediately followed by another which inquired into interviewees’ own notions of public morality. The latter question was an open-ended one, and the hundreds of responses given were categorized as follows.³

Table 10	
Can you offer your notion of public morality briefly?	(%)
Following social norms	27.9
Honesty	26.1
Respecting others	24.9
Being moral / public morality	22.8
Traditions	17.1
Religion, faith	13.9
Honor	12.1
Individual freedom	8.9
Manners, decency	7.9
Family	1.8
Conscience / ethics	.7
Justice	.5
Other responses	8.2
Total	100.0

³ A complete list of open-ended responses is available in Turkish at www.anayasaizleme.org/anket.

9.3. LAWS RESTRICTING RIGHTS

Yet another question pertaining to the restriction of rights and freedoms solicited opinions on the restriction of constitutional rights and freedoms by way of specific legislation such as the “Anti-terror Law” and other laws. 57% of interviewees agreed that “Constitutional rights and freedoms may not be restricted by way of any specific legislation such as the “Anti-terror Law” or any similar laws”.



69% of Kurds and Alevis and 63% of BDP voters agreed with this statement.

As education and income levels go up, disagreement with the statement, or agreement with the idea that rights can be restricted by way of specific legislation increases, albeit slightly.


10. Local Governments

There were four questions in the study about empowering and granting more authority to local governments.

The first question inquired into the perspectives interviewees had toward the granting of authority as a matter of principle, while the other two asked about two concrete examples relating to its practical implementation. The question on mother tongue was previously discussed under “6. Language” (see page 40). The responses show that the society in general does not oppose the granting of authority, but certain segments have some concerns and objections when concrete issues are concerned.

10.1. EMPOWERING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The first statement, “To the extent possible, public services should be administered by local governments elected by the local people”, received support from three-fourths of the people. 12%, however, disagreed with the statement.




Although percentages vary across different demographic and political clusters, agreement with the statement is higher than disagreement in any given cluster. As levels of education and income increase, support for the empowerment of local governments decreases slightly, while as far as agreement with the idea is concerned, the percentage of respondents who express their support more forcefully with “strongly agree” goes up slightly as well. In addition, the average does not vary across educated-uneducated and low income-high income.

Along the right-left axis, agreement is on the rise as one moves from respondents who see themselves on the right to those who see themselves on the left. However, interviewees are in favor of authorizing local governments, without regard to where they position themselves.


There is 75% support for the statement throughout the country, and the rate goes up to 83% among Kurds, while it is 93% when it comes to BDP voters. Although a majority of MHP voters agreed with the idea, the cluster that opposed it most, at one-third of the cluster, is still MHP voters, due to the 18% among them who disagreed with it and 11% who abstained. These varying percentages point to the fact that the topic of granting more authority to local governments is tightly connected to the Kurdish question, as the public debate on the topic also suggests. Responses to the other two statements interviewees were given make this fact even more obvious.

AK Party voters and CHP voters had a neutral approach toward the matter and do not differ from the average percentage of the general public. This finding is particularly remarkable in the following regard: These voter groups hold opposing political views in several other areas, and the fact that they are in agreement on this topic represents a quite unique instance.



10.2. ADDITIONAL TAX LEGISLATION

The first example relating to the grant of more authority to local governments had to do with imposition of additional taxes. 33% agreed with the statement “Elected local governments should be able to introduce tax legislation in addition to the central authority, provided that such legislation shall only apply in their respective jurisdictions”, while 48.5% disagreed with it.



79% of Kurds, and 87% of BDP voters agreed with this statement. Looking at the responses of voters of other parties, the attitude on this topic is seen to be closely related with political party choice: While AK Party voters do not differ from the general public, 52% of CHP voters and in particular 56% of MHP voters disagree with the idea to grant authority to introduce additional tax legislation.

Other factors pertaining to political preferences do not have as determining a role. Where one places oneself along the right-left axis does not create variation. Islamists, democrats and social democrats are most supportive of additional tax legislation, while conservative nationalists and nationalists oppose it the most.


As in the general question on local governments, income and education level affects the response to this particular question as well. There is slightly more support for additional tax legislation among lower income individuals as compared to higher income groups, and among individuals educated below high school level as compared to high school graduates and those holding a university degree.

In terms of place of residence, those most supportive of such legislation reside in urban areas. Even among them the support is at 38%. Rural dwellers are not that supportive of the idea: 57% of them disagreed with it.

In sum, when local government is mentioned in a general and theoretical sense, the public appears in agreement, but when it is exemplified by way of a practical case such as additional tax legislation, opinions then vary to certain extent. However, the fact that the variation takes place among Kurds and especially BDP voters, MHP voters and CHP voters confirms that this is an issue understood as connected with the Kurdish question.

The public debate suggests the idea that Kurdish issue is the barrier before the empowerment of local governments throughout the country, and this particular question offers a hint that the society's perception of the connection with Kurdish issue is along the lines revealed by the question. The other specific example, which dealt with the use of mother tongues in local government, clearly lays bare the opposing views beyond any doubt (see page 40).

Graph 58: Elected local governments should be able to introduce additional tax legislation beyond those issued by the central authority, provided that such legislation shall only apply in their respective jurisdictions. (%)




Analysis

When it comes to local government, the pluralist approach toward cultural identities shrinks relatively, although it does not cease to exist. The anxiety created by the Kurdish issue elevates to “alert” mode from time to time and causes the demand for freedom and pluralism erode. This could be due to the fact that these concepts are “learned” in a sense through the media and other routes. However, although the Kurdish issue is an important one, it is not right to associate everything with that issue. The topic of local governments is one of such issues... All societies, including Turkish society no doubt, are full of “contradictions” due to the countless calamities (at least the coups) they experienced. These “contradictions”, however, are rather defined by speculative constructions, while life is in fact full of interrelations, transitions, and intermediate colors before one reaches the edges. The public fears polarizations, others, and identities described as “other”, and to leave these fears behind, it seeks refuge in “fixed” and “strong” points of references such as the state, while supporting “pro-freedom” interpretations at the same time.

11. The Role of the Judiciary

11.1. MONITORING THE INSTITUTIONS

84% of interviewees agreed that “No institution should be excluded from judicial review, including the President, the Government, and the Army”.



Without regard to the demographic or political cluster, everyone agrees with the statement, but at varying rates. Although agreement does not vary with education level or income level, the percentage of those “strongly agree” increases steadily as education and income levels rise.


The percentage of BDP voters agreeing with the statement is 4 points lower than that of the general public; however, most of those who disagreed responded with an indecisive “neither agree nor disagree” rather than “disagree” or “strongly disagree”.

In terms of the attitudes adopted in the referendum, agreement does not vary to an extent that signifies difference in political views, but respondents who said “not enough but yes” in the referendum agree with the idea are at 78%, a rate that is slightly below that of the national average.

Aside from these findings, there is no noteworthy difference in terms of political identity, right-left identification or political party choice and the percentages vary between 80 to 90 percent.

11.2. SHOULD MILITARY COURTS BE ABOLISHED?

The plain statement “Military Courts should be abolished” found a 38% agreement among interviewees. A higher percentage (46%), however, disagreed with the statement.




Certain segments of the society with their differing viewpoints on other topics also diverge noticeably with respect to this issue. Although AK Party voters' views do not differ from those of the general public, 55% of CHP voters and 60% of MHP voters oppose the abolishing of Military Courts. 75% of BDP voters and 70% of Kurds would like to see them abolished.

The preferred political identity is also related with the perspective toward this statement: Agreement with the idea to abolish Military Courts is highest among democrats and conservatives and then Islamists and social democrats. Conservative nationalists and Atatürkists disagree with it the most.

Because the question does not offer a hint as to whether it is necessary to abolish Military Courts completely or to abolish them and try members of the army in civilian courts, it is not very obvious which likelihood interviewees had in mind when responding. Thus, the question does not lend itself to a deeper interpretation.

11.3. CAN THE JUDICIARY SIDE WITH THE STATE, IF NECESSARY?

When given the statement “The judiciary should be able to side with the state and against the individual when the reputation and interest of the state are at stake”, the society seems to be split into two in that circumstance: 45% agreed that it could, while 38% said it could not. In terms of demographic and political clusters, answers vary highly and there are remarkable differences of opinion between different clusters.



There is a 6-point difference between the least educated and the most educated clusters, with more educated individuals being more supportive of the view that sides with the individual. Low income respondents agree more with the idea that the judiciary can side with the state in such a circumstance, and the agreement rate drops as income increases.


53% of Kurds opposed the idea that the judiciary should be able to side with the state and against the individual when the reputation of the state is at stake, which is a finding that stands out. 38% of Kurds agreed with the statement. There is a similar situation in the case of Alevis: 50% of them disagreed with the statement, while 34% agreed with it.

50% of AK Party voters and 51% of MHP voters expressed strong support for the state by agreeing with the statement, while 46% of CHP voters and 47% of BDP voters opposed it and emphasized the individual. On the basis of the data here, it is possible to talk about two political poles. In fact, 50% of those who boycotted the referendum, 43% of those who cast a “no” vote disagree with the idea that the judiciary could side with the state. 49% of those who said “yes” and 50% of those who said “not enough but yes” in the referendum agree with the idea. Respondents who self-identified as conservative nationalist, conservative and nationalist are siding with the state at higher percentages, while democrats and social democrats side with the individual at higher percentages.

The picture is also quite clear when one looks at the right-left axis: 53% of those on the far right support the state, while 51% of those on the far left support the individual. There is a chance that this particular finding does not offer a novel piece of information, given that any basic and traditional definition of political right and left refers to the individual-state relationship and emphasizes either the former or the latter.


It is nevertheless worthy of note that there is support among right-winger for the individual and there is support for the state among left-wingers. This indicates that these political identities do not represent diametrical opposites in contemporary Turkey.

Graph 62: The judiciary should be able to side with the state and against the individual when the reputation and interest of the state are at stake. (Percentage agreeing - %)



11.4. THE JUDICIARY'S CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL

Although there is difference at first sight as to judiciary's ability to side with the state if necessary in the event of a conflict between the individual and the state, the general public is seen to be in agreement about whether the judiciary's obligation to protect the individual should be enshrined in the constitution: 77% agreed that "the judiciary has an obligation to protect the individual and not the state, and this obligation must be enshrined in the constitution". 11% disagreed with this statement.



In terms of demographic and political clusters, there is no significant difference of opinion with respect to the role of the judiciary in regards to the reconciliation between the individual and the state, as was the case in the previous question. The most remarkable finding is Kurds' differing attitude and the inclination along the right-left axis.


Although there is no difference in percentages of agreement across levels of education, preference for "strongly agree" is on the rise as the level of education increases, as was the case in the question concerning judicial review. In terms of income level, the lowest income group agreed more and the highest income group agreed less with the inclusion of such a provision in the constitution, yet this cannot be considered a significant difference.

86% of Kurds, 86% of BDP voters and 84% of respondents who boycotted the referendum agreed with the statement. MHP voters, who are at the opposite end politically, do not have such a definite attitude: They agree with it at a lower percentage (74%), which is only 3 points less.

It can be concluded that the inclusion of a provision concerning the protection of the individual in the new constitution is not a cause of polarization. As a matter of fact, because everyone agrees with the statement, no interpretation can be offered even though there is variation in terms of political identities.

While everyone along the right-left axis agrees with the statement, there is a gradual increase in agreement as one moves from the right to the left, which can be understood as a sign of consistency as that increase represents the perspective of the right and the left toward established matters.

Graph 64: The Judiciary has an obligation to protect the individual and not the state, and this obligation must be placed in the constitution. (%)



Considering the responses to the previous question (11.3) and the present one collectively, the 77% that prioritizes the individual opts for the state over the individual when it is the “reputation of the state” that is at stake.

Table 11

The Judiciary has an obligation to protect the individual and not the state, and this obligation must be placed in the constitution.	The judiciary should be able to side with the state and against the individual when the reputation and interest of the state are at stake.			
	Strongly disagree / Disagree (%)	Neither agree nor disagree (%)	Strongly agree / Agree (%)	Total
Strongly disagree / Disagree	3	1	6	11
Neither agree nor disagree	2	5	6	12
Strongly agree / Agree	33	11	34	77
Total	38	16	46	100

Analysis

First of all, while there was a “nationalist-left” emphasis among the statist hardcore in the responses to previous questions (concerning the nationalism of Atatürk, whether it would be alright if Ankara were not the capital, and Turkish as official language etc.), this particular question, which inquired into whether the judiciary could side with the state, reveals an added “right-conservative” emphasis in the context of the “sacredness of the state”. In other words, different segments might be reproducing the state as a sacred entity (and thus, the weakness of social-cultural identities) for varying motives.

In general, it is seen that concepts such as “the state”, “the reputation of the state” and “the interest of the state” imply, for an important segment of the society, both a “protecting-safeguarding” entity and one that is supreme and thus “needs to be protected/preserved”. Undoubtedly, this interpretation is not unrelated to the almost “God-like” notion of state created within the atmosphere into which citizens of the Republic of Turkey are socialized. However, when the “constitution” is at issue, the image that comes to mind is “a text that is created by human beings”. This is a text that has the capacity to accommodate the individual and the differences between individuals. Therefore, although “the individual” may lose its importance when “the state” is at stake, the constitution is an “earthly” text or a “human product” in which the importance of “the individual” can be reflected. This analysis could also imply that a constitution that protects the individual could be perceived as a reliable and democratic tool that can undo “untouchable sacredness” of the state.


12. Governance and Checks and Balance Among Public Institutions

To inquire into which institution should have the highest authority and power in governing the country, as well as the final say in cases of no consensus, two questions were asked. The aim was to obtain interviewees' opinions about the mechanisms of checks and balances among public institutions.

12.1. HIGHEST AUTHORITY IN GOVERNING THE COUNTRY

When asked “In your opinion, who should have the highest authority and power in governing the country?”, 56% responded “Grand National Assembly”, 23% said “head of state, the president” and 20% answered “prime minister and the government”.

Graph 65: In your opinion, who should have the highest authority and power in governing the country? (%)



The responses varied across main demographic characteristics such as income, education, ethnic origin and political preferences.

There is highly noticeable variation among responses across income brackets: 41% of respondents in the lowest income bracket thought the Grand National Assembly should be highest authority. In the highest income bracket, however, the percentage is 77%. While the responses “head of state” and “prime minister” hover around 30% in the low income bracket, “head of state” is preferred by 16% of those in the highest income bracket, while those who respond “prime minister” is as low as 7%.


The percentage of individuals educated below high school level preferring “Grand National Assembly” (48%) is lower than that of the national average, while the percentage is much higher among respondents with a university degree (78%).

Women prefer “Grand National Assembly” more, men prefer it less.


Kurds and Alevis attach more importance to the Grand National Assembly. “Head of State” and “prime minister” are responses with proportionally lower rates among Kurds. While a lower percentage of Alevis preferred “prime minister”, the rate of preference for “head of state” did not vary among them.

There is an obvious variation in the responses across political party choices. 30% of AK Party voters said “prime minister and the government should have the authority”. MHP voters, however, sided more with the two other institutions, in particular with the Grand National Assembly, rather than with the prime minister. CHP voters and BDP voters put a strong emphasis on the Grand National Assembly: 73% of the former and 80% of the latter chose the parliament. CHP voters’ second choice is the head of state, while for BDP voters it is the prime minister and the government.

Respondents who voted “yes” in the referendum would prefer the prime minister to have highest authority, and those who voted “no” prefer the Grand National Assembly. It can be concluded that these choices confirm the emergent results according to political preference.



In terms of political identity preferences, it is noteworthy that the emphasis on Grand National Assembly gets stronger as one moves from the right to the left, and social democrats and democrats choose the Grand National Assembly, whereas Islamists and conservatives opt for the prime minister and conservative nationalists for head of state, more than the average does.




The percentage supporting that highest authority should be held by the prime minister and the government doubles among respondents who thought that it would suffice if the government made the new constitution instead of seeking the consensus of all political parties or all segments of the society. Similarly, among respondents who were satisfied with the ongoing process to make the constitution, the percentage offering the prime minister/government response is twice that of the average.

The responses to the question below (12.2), “who should have the ultimate decision making power when there is no consensus among organs of the state?” are consistent with the answers to this question. Among those who believed it is the government that should have the final say in case of no consensus in state organs, the percentage who thought the prime minister/government should have the highest authority moves up by 2.5 times, that is from 20% to 50%. Among respondents who thought the Grand National Assembly should have the final say, the percentage thinking that Grand National Assembly should have the highest authority increases from 56% to 76%.

12.2. WHO SHOULD HAVE THE ULTIMATE DECISION MAKING POWER?

When asked “Who should have the ultimate decision making power when there is no consensus among organs of the state”, 44% responded “Constitutional Court”, 39% said “Grand National Assembly”, and 17% answered the “government”.

Graph 68: Who should have the ultimate decision making power when there is no consensus among organs of the state? (%)



In terms of demographic clusters, the findings are as follows:

Respondents with below high school education favored the government; high school graduates preferred the Grand National Assembly, and those with a university degree opted for the Constitutional Court at higher percentages when it came to whose decision should be the ultimate one.

Men favored the Grand National Assembly more, while women preferred the government more prevalently.

The percentage of Kurds favoring the Grand National Assembly is 16 points higher, while the percentage of Alevis preferring the Constitutional Court is 10 points higher.

In terms of political party choices:


The percentage of AK Party voters responding “government” is 7 points higher, while the respective percentages of CHP voters and MHP voters who preferred “Constitutional Court” are 8 and 6 points higher, and the percentage of BDP voters who opted for the “Grand National Assembly” is 38 points higher. The percentage of BDP voters who said that it is the Grand National Assembly that must make the final decision is twice that of the national average.

Respondents who voted No in the referendum have higher rates of support for the “Constitutional Court”, while those who boycotted it preferred the “Grand National Assembly” at a higher rate.

Islamists and conservatives emphasize the government more, democrats stress the Grand National Assembly more, and Atatürkists highlight the Constitutional Court more. Half of social democrats preferred the Grand National Assembly, about half of them opted for the Constitutional Courts, and only 7% of them said the government when it came to who should make the final decision.

The profile of distribution of responses across the right-left axis remains roughly the same, although the preference for government increases and that for the Constitutional Court decreases as one moves from the right to the left.

Graph 69: Who should have the ultimate decision making power when there is no consensus among organs of the state? (%)



AK Party voters, who are the ones that elected the currently ruling party, prefer the government as the ultimate decision maker. CHP voters and MHP voters, Alevis, university graduates, those who voted No in the referendum, Atatürkists opt for the Constitutional Court, which suggests that their assessment is based on a political instinct shaped by opposition to the ruling party. In fact, when the responses on *laïcité*, principles of Atatürk and Military Courts are evaluated collectively, this observation becomes even more obvious.

As the belief that *laïcité* should be retained in the constitution gets stronger, so does the belief that the Constitutional Court must make the ultimate decision. Among respondents who answered that Constitutional Court must have the final say, there is more support for the statement “The constitution should refer to the principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk”, but there is at the same time more opposition to “Military Courts should be abolished”.


Analysis

In this section, there are highly interesting findings “between the lines” of percentages. First and foremost, while the Grand National Assembly has had very low rates of reputation/trustworthiness (in fact, higher than only that of the media) for years as indicated by public opinion surveys conducted in Turkey, this study shows the institution has gained significant prestige. It is also found that the word “Grand National Assembly” softens the concept of “state”, making it a tangible notion and apparatus stripped of its sacredness and inviolability. As such, Grand National Assembly is seen as a place where pluralism can be manifest. However, and still following a “guarantee-seeking” logic, interviewees for the most part can waive pluralism “if there will be conflict”; therefore, the idea to preserve “the state” is relied upon as a type of guarantee. In other words, an “arbiter” or the Constitutional Court comes into the picture as a form of safety net.

13. Elections and Politics

13.1. ELECTION THRESHOLD

In regards to the election threshold, which requires political parties competing in the elections to win at least 10% of the vote to be able to have seats in the Grand National Assembly, interviewees were asked what they thought about the proposal to lower that threshold to 4%. 37% agreed with the proposition, while 42% disagreed with it.




The 4% election threshold proposal received highest amount of support from the Kurds (68%), and in particular from BDP voters (88%).

Clusters that offer a higher rate of support for the proposal than the average include Alevis (54%) and CHP voters (46%). Social democrats and democrats also display high rates of support. As one moves toward the left along the right-left axis, agreement with the proposal increases.


As could be anticipated, the groups that oppose lowering the election threshold to 4% are as follows: 57% of respondents who self-identify as conservative nationalists and 55% of MHP voters disagreed with the proposal. Half of the respondents who identified themselves as nationalist and conservative were not in favor of it, either. 47% of AK Party voters disagreed, while 29% of them agreed with the proposal to lower the threshold to 4%.

As income level rises, opposition to the low threshold increases, and other than that, there is not any significant variation in terms of demographic characteristics.



13.2. REMOVING ELECTED OFFICIALS FROM OFFICE

“Persons who are elected to political offices such as members of parliament, mayors should be liable to be removed from office by way of the signatures of a certain number of voters in their respective constituencies and without waiting for the next election” is a statement with which two-thirds of the interviewees agreed.




The general preference does not vary that much across different political and demographic clusters and generally speaking everyone agrees with the statement. Following clusters stand out due to the variation in their rates of support:

At 66%, CHP voters are the group most supportive of the idea.

As compared to the average, Kurds are to some extent opposed to the idea. While more than half of them agreed with it, 31% of them disagreed, which is a somewhat high rate of disagreement. 46% of BDP voters directly said they disagreed with the idea.

13.3. CLOSING DOWN POLITICAL PARTIES

61% of interviewees affirmed the statement “Except when they are expressly connected with any violent acts, political parties should not be closed down for any reason at all”.



It can be concluded that the groups most opposed to the closing down of political parties are the following sets of voters due to their past experience with the issue:

- 88% of BDP voters oppose the practice.
- 64% of AK Party voters oppose it.
- 83% of Kurds oppose it.

In terms of political identities, among respondents opposing party shut-downs the most include social democrats, democrats and Atatürkists.


69% of Alevis disagree with the idea to close down parties as well.

Respondents who thought political parties may, if necessary, be closed down at higher rates than that of national average include MHP voters and conservative nationalists.


More than half of conservative nationalists disagreed with the statement “political parties should not be closed down”. However, although 34% of MHP voters disagreed with the statement, 51% of them favored it, thus, it is necessary to note that as a voter group, they are against closing down parties.

In terms of demographic clusters, the percentage of opposition to party close-downs increases as age goes up and the level of education and income goes down.

Graph 74: Political parties should not be closed down for any reason at all, unless they have a clear link to violence. (%)




Graph 75: Political parties should not be closed down for any reason at all, unless they have a clear link to violence. (%)



14. Military Service in the New Constitution

A large majority of the society (70%) thought that military service, currently compulsory for all males in Turkey, should stay as-is in the new constitution and continue to be compulsory. However, three out every ten individuals prefer a transition to a professional army, and would like the new constitution to make room for social service and conscientious objection instead of compulsory military service.

Graph 76: In regards to military service, which of the following opinions would you prefer to have in the constitution? (%)



Considering whose views on military service differ from those of the general public or which demographic characteristics have an influence on this topic, the first point that stands out is that demand for keeping military service compulsory is higher and demand for a transition to a professional army is lower in clusters with low levels of income and education, as compared to the general public. In clusters with higher income and education levels, the demand for transitioning into a professional army dramatically increases. In fact, demands for social service and conscientious objection are on the rise in a similar manner, however, the shift from compulsory service to professional army is very striking.

Men are also found to prefer a professional army more. The impact of age appears in two ways: The percentage of respondents at younger ages who prefer social service and conscientious objection is five points more, while that of the senior age group is almost five points less.


In terms of political identities, there is not much variation among respondents subscribing to different identities when it comes to maintaining the status quo and the ranking among percentages of responses is kept intact. Also in each identity group, there are respondents favoring conscientious objection, social service, as well as transitioning to a professional army.

Diverging from other political identity categories, less than half of democrats and social democrats supported compulsory service. The right-left axis does not demonstrate any significant variation.

As in many other areas, political party choice plays a quite determining role when it comes to military service. AK Party and MHP voters support compulsory military service at higher rates and social service and conscientious objection at lower rates compared to the average. Among these voters, the percentage favoring a professional army is not different from the general public.

The diverging characteristic of CHP voters is that while they rank compulsory service first, they emphasize the availability of social service more than the average does. BDP voters' views towards military service is very different: Half of them would like the new constitution to refer to conscientious objection and one-fourth prefers a reference to professional army.

Graph 77: In regards to military service, which of the following opinions would you prefer to have in the constitution? (%)




Support for the view that military service might not be compulsory and that the new constitution need not stipulate it to be obligatory ranges from 15% to 85% across different segments of the society, in other words, at a very broad range.

However, two main strands are discernible: First, those with low levels of income and education oppose the establishment of a professional army, thinking that their chances of being drafted to that army are much higher, and therefore they prefer that military service be obligatory for all males. Second, BDP voters, who represent that segment of Kurds which has a stronger demand for identity, have quite dominant demands for conscientious objection.

The proposals that are being presented in discussions concerning the revision of the current status of military service need to pay heed to the demands of both these strands and put forward fair and equitable legislation.

Graph 78: In regards to military service, which of the following opinions would you prefer to have in the constitution? (%)



15. Clustering Analysis

Upon carrying out a clustering analysis by collectively analyzing all questions geared toward measuring expectations and demands from the constitution, three clusters emerge in society on the basis of the responses received.

The first five questions that most effectively and strongly determine the clusters in the clustering analysis are listed in the table below based on the strength of their respective impacts.

Table 12	
Questions	Choices
Which should be the official national language?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Turkish only.• In addition to Turkish, other languages spoken in the country can be an official language as well.
What should be the language of education in primary education? (%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Turkish only.• In addition to Turkish, anyone can receive instruction in the language they acquired from their parents and they speak.
The constitution should refer to the principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk.	Strongly disagree / Disagree / Neither agree nor disagree / Agree / Strongly agree
In your opinion, who should have the highest authority and power in governing the country?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Grand National Assembly• Prime Minister and Government• Head of State - President
Who must have the ultimate decision making power when there is no consensus among organs of the state?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Government• Grand National Assembly• Constitutional Court

The first two questions with the strongest impact on variation or assuming different positions relate to official language and the language of education. Third comes the issue of the nationalism of Atatürk, followed by the fourth and fifth questions inquiring into the system of “checks and balances” as regards the state.


We also know from public debates that most controversial discussions in the process of making the new constitution revolve around these particular questions.

Before considering the answers the three clusters gave in response to these questions, the following factors stand out in terms of their respective demographic compositions:

Table 13			
Cluster size	% 43.5	% 42.4	% 14.1
	1 st Cluster	2 nd Cluster	3 rd Cluster
Gender	Equal ratio of females and males	Equal ratio of females and males	Higher ratio of males (60%)
Education	University-educated 18%	University-educated 7%	University-educated 20%
Ethnic origin	Large majority of Kurds in this cluster		
Religion - sect		No Alevis in this cluster	
Left - right	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Left-wingers are 32% • Right-wingers are 16% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Left-wingers are 5% • Right-wingers are 44% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Left-wingers are 27% • Right-wingers are 25%
Political identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Islamist 26% • Atatürkist 27% • Democrat 22% 		
Political party choice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AK Party 28% • CHP 13% • MHP 1% • BDP 29% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AK Party 64% • CHP 7% • MHP 8% • No BDP voters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AK Party 27% • CHP 37% • MHP 16% • BDP 2%


Official language

Over four-fifths of those in the first cluster thought other languages can also be an official language.




Language of education

95% of those in the first cluster agreed that one can receive instruction in one's mother tongue.




Principles and Reforms of Atatürk

94.5% of those in the third cluster favored the idea that the constitution should make reference to the principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk.




Governing the Country

While those in the second cluster are evenly divided into three with respect to governing the country, those in the first and third clusters prefer that the Grand National Assembly have the ultimate authority and the power



Having the Ultimate Decision Making Power

For those in the first cluster, the ultimate decision making power should be the Grand National Assembly, for those in the third it should be the Constitutional Court.



The following points can be made about the three clusters: The first cluster adopted more democratic approaches as compared to the others, while the second cluster occupies a middle ground and there are more hardliners in the third one.

In regards to some of the other general preferences, the following differences can be noted among the three clusters:

- 61% of respondents in the first cluster preferred “humanitarian society”, 48% of those in the second cluster favored “strong state” and 33% of them “humanitarian society”, whereas 40% of the respondents in the third cluster chose “strong state” and 26% of them preferred “stable economy”.
- Half of those in the first cluster did not express satisfaction with the ongoing constitutional process, and the rate of dissatisfaction drops to one-third in the second cluster. Two-thirds of those in the third cluster did not endorse the process, but considering their general characteristics, their dissatisfaction has to do directly with the effort to amend the existent constitution, not with the fact that the process has not been a participatory one.
- One-fifth of those in the first cluster preferred that the constitution not make reference to laïcité at all, while three-fifths wanted to see a redefined version of the concept. Three-fifths of those in the third cluster would like the new constitution to retain laïcité as it currently is.
- 98% of those in the first cluster favor “apology/compensation/both” in regards to incidents such as Dersim, Uludere, whereas half of those in the third cluster said nothing should be done in regards to these issues.
- With respect to the issue of identities in the constitution, three-fourths of those in the first cluster would like other identities to be referenced to in the constitution, whereas three-fifths of those in the third cluster said only Turkish identity should be mentioned.

Overall Analysis

This study, which highlights expectations from the constitution, offers significant hints that politics has -in spite of everything- normalized in Turkey. The general axis of tension has morphed from a type of lack of politics straddling the state and the society since the early 2000s into “politics” transpiring within society. It is now possible to talk about political relations “between social forces”, even though some of those forces are more powerful than others or hold the governing power. This political field is not one without problems, but it is laden with all sorts of shifts. For instance, “there is AK Party on the one side, and then there are others “ is no longer a valid classification. This type of political polarization can take on very different characteristics thanks to the alliances that are built and rebuilt. For instance, “AK Party-CHP-MHP” can come to an agreement in regards to the Kurdish question, while there could be a different alliance in the form of “AK Party-BDP-Kurds-Islamists-democrats” when it comes to cultural identities and freedoms in general. In other words, this is precisely what politics is which creates “new meanings”.

Therefore, if the constitution to be made pays attention not to “outdated meanings”, but to “meanings that are being renewed”, and not to decisive categories, but rather to plural, transitive lives that are not defined on the basis of specific identities, and entails awareness toward demands for freedom in these areas accordingly, it could pave the way for a society which leads a healthier life and become free of fears.

16. About the Research

16.1. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH

The research was conducted by KONDA Research and Consulting on behalf of Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV).

The field study was carried out on 22-23 September 2012. This report reflects the opinions and preferences of the above-18 year old adult population in Turkey about some of the major constitutional issues on the days the study was conducted.

The research has been designed and conducted to survey and evaluate the expectations of individuals over 18 in Turkey from the new constitution; to learn their opinions and preferences in relation to certain fundamental constitutional issues, and also to identify the political, social, cultural, economic and demographic factors that influence these opinions, preferences and expectations.

Research findings have a margin of error of + / - 2 in the 95% confidence interval and + / - 2.6 margin of error in the 99% confidence interval.

16.2. THE SAMPLE

The sample was determined by stratifying the population sizes, neighborhood and village educational averages based on the data available in the Address-based Population Registry (ADNKS) with the neighborhood and village-level results of the local elections held on 29 March 2009.

Residential areas were first separated as rural/urban/metropolitan and the sample was determined on the basis of 12 regions. As part of the research, face-to-face interviews were held with 2699 individuals in their residences in a total of 150 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts in 29 provinces including Ankara.

Table 14	
Number of provinces visited	29
Number of districts visited	101
Number of neighborhoods/villages visited	150
Number of interviewees	2699

The 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood were subject to age and gender quotas.

Table 15		
Age group	Female	Male
18-28	3 interviewees	3 interviewees
29-44	3 interviewees	3 interviewees
44 and above	3 interviewees	3 interviewees
	Level 1 (12 regions)	The cities survey conducted in
1	İstanbul	İstanbul
2	Western Marmara	Tekirdağ, Balıkesir
3	Aegean	İzmir, Denizli, Kütahya
4	Eastern Marmara	Bursa, Eskişehir, Kocaeli
5	Western Anatolia	Ankara, Konya
6	Mediterranean	Antalya, Adana, Mersin, Hatay
7	Central Anatolia	Kayseri, Sivas
8	Western Black Sea	Samsun, Bartın
9	Eastern Black Sea	Trabzon, Rize
10	Northeast Anatolia	Erzurum, Kars
11	Mideastern Anatolia	Malatya, Tunceli
12	Southeast Anatolia	Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, Mardin

Table 16					
	The region survey conducted	Type of residence			
		Rural	Urban	Metropolitan	Total
1	İstanbul			19.4	19.4
2	Western Marmara	2.0	3.1		5.1
3	Aegean	3.9	6.0	5.3	15.2
4	Eastern Marmara	1.3	2.7	5.3	9.3
5	Western Anatolia	0.7		10.1	10.8
6	Mediterranean	3.3	2.7	6.1	12.0
7	Central Anatolia	1.4	2.0	1.3	4.8
8	Western Black Sea	2.7	3.4		6.1
9	Eastern Black Sea	1.3	1.9		3.3
10	Northeast Anatolia	1.1			1.1
11	Mideastern Anatolia	1.3	2.1		3.4
12	Southeast Anatolia	2.1	2.8	4.7	9.5
	Total	21.1	26.7	52.2	100.0

17. In Place of a Conclusion

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Pursuit of the Lost Future

1- THE SHADOW OF PHANTOMS

Field studies aim to understand general social preferences, what people do and do not like, and therefore to identify what they will support and what they will not. However, any majority that corresponds to a general tendency in fact represents a social coalition, and particularly in countries like Turkey, the experience of such a coalition transpires through cultural identities and communities, rather than modern socioeconomic criteria. In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind that these identities are not fixed; they fluctuate over time and are sociologically transitive. Nevertheless, this particular study conducted with a sample of roughly 2700 individuals throughout the country in September 2012 can offer a functional idea of the cultural and ideological divisions. Accordingly, it will be useful to begin this evaluation by considering the divisions...

The first point to be made is that the left/right division in Turkey maintains its traditional proportion with one person on the left for every two on the right (17% on the left to 31% on the right), but that the definition of left/right itself is becoming meaningless. In fact, the response “neither” was given by the highest percentage (37%) and half of the society positioned themselves outside those identities. This suggests subordinate political identities becoming more important. Considering these subordinate identities alongside cultural differences could present a map of the implicit and open-ended clusterings in contemporary Turkey. Looking at how people defined themselves, “Atatürkist” is the response with the highest percentage (28.2%), and it can be suggested that this is a sign of the ideological vacuum in the laïc segment of the society. Adding “left” political identities to this group, the “laïc” community reaches the borderline of 36.5%. The percentage of the nationalist/conservative/Islamist alliance, however, is 41.5%, not counting the MHP voters.

This panorama reveals the critical importance of MHP voters and “democrats” (amounting to 7.2% in this study) who remain outside both categories. Reaching a simple majority requires an alliance with one of these groups (preferably MHP, in terms of numbers involved) and the skill to accomplish the political mobilization implied by that requisite. This is an important point, given that one senses the shadow of the AK Party rule in the backdrop of all of the responses in this study. In fact, just about all issues raised by AK Party or the Prime Minister lead to positive or negative approaches expressed by sides that are in bloc formation. Whether the pendulum swings to one or the other end depends on whether or not major groupings have internal ruptures and receive support from one of the abovementioned smaller groups. This tension comes to the fore particularly in matters pertaining to the Kurdish issue, and it in fact becomes manifest that the Kurdish issue is yet another phantom with a firm grip on the experience of daily life. In cases where any given right or freedom is perceived in an anonymous, or identity-free manner and in the context of citizenship per se, the responses may turn out to be quite freedom-prone, but when a given issue is presented in the context of Kurdish identity, they may acquire a conservative

character. Thus, it is no surprise to find out that most influential statements voiced by AK Party or the Prime Minister politically are those relating to the Kurdish issue. This in turn implies this is an issue where two phantoms collide, resulting in crystal clear ruptures.

When we consider the issue with this background in mind, one of the most important findings in the study is that the “ideal constitution” is expected to resolve the Kurdish question...This response was provided by the highest percentage of both Kurds and Turks (59.4% and 53.1%, respectively). It is useful underscore at this point that respondents who positioned themselves at the center have primarily economic expectations from the new constitution, and that CHP voters are the group with the highest percentage awaiting solutions to economic problems. This suggests that the government may be left alone with respect to the vitally important Kurdish issue not just in a political sense, but also in terms of social base. Yet another question concerning the general characteristics of the constitution demonstrates that the most important principle is “justice against unfairness” (56.1%), followed by “equality among all kinds of differences such as Turk, Kurd, Sunni, Alevi” (50.4%). The interesting finding here is that freedom could only come in third place (35.6%). Two reasons could be deduced from this, drawing some inspiration from other responses in conjunction: Freedom is essentially experienced within cultural groups and significant issues concentrate on supra-group and inter-group relations. The last choice available in response to that question, “continuity of the state against all types of separation and destruction” received support from only 33.6% of the respondents. However, as will be demonstrated below, the state still has an unrivalled place in Turkish society’s imagination of order, stability and peace. But there is now a demand for a “functional” state; that is, one that can work for the citizens. A state that exists for its own sake is desired at points of rupture, but such a state is becoming unacceptable in an ideal context.

2- TOWARDS BECOMING A SOCIETY

Looking at the study as a whole, it will be useful to highlight certain characteristics that encompass all segments and identities in society. Perhaps, it is these common perceptions and preferences that will move Turkey away from being a spectrum made up of distinct communities and towards becoming a society.

The first of these characteristics is the recognition that there needs to be a focus on the short term future and no positive outcome can be obtained without overcoming these challenges. The Kurdish issue sets an obvious example in this regard. It can be said that people in Turkey are generally looking for solutions that are distilled through a given ideology and thus divided, but that are quite realistic and functional nonetheless.

Second, it can be concluded that the weight of the past is rapidly declining across all segments. The response with the highest percentage (45.2%) to the question that combines the Dersim, 6-7 September, Sivas Madımak and Uludere incidents referred to both the issuance of an apology and the payment of compensation. Adding those who opted for at least one of the above, the rate goes up to 69%. The interesting finding is that people who called themselves “Turk” or “Sunni” offered the same amount of support (65% and 67% respectively). In other words, the majority in each subordinate identity group is observed to have left behind the mental residues relating to the past, which is a sign that it will be possible to build the psychological infrastructure that will expedite the progress on Kurdish and Alevi issues.

Third, as the questions inquiring into norms and ideal situations demonstrate, each segment displays an intense desire to normalize and become a “society”. All the responses imply integration and not exclusion, but one observes obvious ruptures when it comes to how integration is to take place. Although the ruptures are quite blatant, their willingness for integration is nevertheless worthy of notice.

And fourth, “inhabiting a paradox”; an attitude also encountered in qualitative field studies, is very clearly exemplified in this research. Responses that appear to be contradictory could be offered in two consecutive questions, and does not usually mean a separation in terms of identities.. It is useful to underline the distinctness of the Kurdish issue at this point: Because when it comes to the Kurdish issue, the paradoxes collide with identity-related ruptures, while in the case of other issues, they seem to be internal mental inconsistencies within a given cultural identity, and the people do not seem to be disturbed by that. One possible reason might be that responses to each question represent a different concern, which is a sign that the average person in Turkey has issues that are difficult to resolve in unison.

The emerging conclusion is that despite all our uneasiness, we are a people that would like to be courageous while at the same fearing the cost of that courage, and therefore seek to be realistic yet find ourselves in contradictory positions at each step toward that realism. In specific contexts, these dilemmas leave people unsure between the openness that is a condition of becoming a society and the fears resulting from the failure to become one.

3- FROM DESIRES TO PLURALISM, FROM ANXIETIES TO THE STATE

The parallel between the desire to become a society and the fear of failure to become one emerges quite obviously in this present study. There are two axes we observe: The first is the root of the declarations of normative truths based on our desires, which emphasize pluralism as the ground on which these truths can materialize. The second one, motivated by the anxiety associated with conflicts and separations, leads to the search for a sound and realistic attitude, which in turn generates arguments in favor of a solution through the state.

These two axes do not necessarily appear to be monopolized by given cultural identities. Naturally, respondents who self-identify as nationalist and right-wing would be expected to follow the logic prevailing along the second axis, while those who identified themselves as democrat or left-wing would be expected to subscribe to the first axis. The results are actually corroborative of these expectations. However, when it comes to such a critical area as the Kurdish issue, which is important for becoming a society but also implies ruptures. We are witnessing a convergence of the two axes that moves beyond cultural identity diversity and clusters around two clear-cut choices.

In addition, it is patently obvious that our perceptions, desires and ideals are not that realistic in today’s Turkey. Perhaps, pluralism is a kind of interim solution when the ideal destination cannot be achieved. In an ideal world, the abolishing of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and autonomous religious communities can be defensible positions. Individuals from all segments would be likely to argue in favor of those positions. Nevertheless, given Turkey’s current context, the rupture emerges as to not whether this institution needs to be abolished or not, but instead as to how pluralist its services will need to be. In other words, at the point where ideal norms face the realities, desires are satisfied by advancing through pluralism and arriving at pragmatic solutions that are not based on principles.

Across from this tendency, there sits a test of realism filled with experiences of anxiety. The extent to which positions taken on the basis of anxieties are realistic poses another question. The introversions implied by worries are as unrealistic as the ideals. This is because there is a high chance that the introversions themselves might aggravate the situation which are the roots of the troubling experiences. We cannot claim that respondents reasoned these issues out rationally. Nonetheless, the search for an arbitrating state at every

complex junction and positioning this arbiter role above politics might be a reflection of the dilemma mentioned above. As it seems, at the bottleneck Turkey now faces, there is a widespread notion that a controlled pluralism guided by the state will allow for long term and durable solutions to urgent problems. This in turn might explain the uncomfortable and fluctuating performance of the AK Party government, which takes care to keep the pulse of society with respect to reforms.

4- IDEALS AND NORMS

The most remarkable issue along the first axis motivated by desires, is the general public's willingness to catch up with global civilizational standards. In any given area, when a question inquires about "that which should happen", we encounter a freedom-prone and egalitarian, and therefore equitable imagination of the future. We notice that functionality of this imagination is perceived in terms of the skills to become a society. Conversely, we can argue that there is now a realization that the prerequisite to becoming a society involves the appropriation of certain "universal" norms.

The fact that 69% of respondents said "development should never take place at the expense of the environment" could mean both the repetition of a learned truth and an awareness that any other response would represent a disgrace in today's world. But the 75% agreement with "The constitution should be in harmony with universal principles and the international agreements Turkey is a party to, and there should be no exceptions in this regard" shows that a significant mental threshold has been crossed. Looking at the other side of the coin, the 76.3% agreement with "any person who wishes to wear the headscarf should be able to do so, including public employees such as teachers and judges" can be construed as a sign that the threshold in question is also being surpassed in the social context.

Considering issues that are directly related to governing, it is clear that the preferred norms consistently point to an "advanced" democracy: Three-fourths of the society supported the idea that "To the extent possible, public services should be administered by local governments elected by the people", and two-thirds agreed that persons who are elected to political offices should be liable to be removed from office without waiting for the next election and by way of the signatures of a certain number of voters in their respective constituencies. 61% responded "except when they are expressly connected with any violent acts, political parties should not be closed down for any reason at all", and 72% supported "citizens' freedoms to sustain the group, cultural identity or the community to which they belong". With respect to the judiciary, 77% responded "the judiciary has an obligation to protect the individual and not the state, and this obligation must be enshrined in the constitution". Furthermore, 84% agreed that "No institution should be excluded from judicial review, including the President, the Government, and the Army". Finally, in regards to the state's obligations to its citizens, 70% of the people agreed that the state should stay neutral toward all kinds of individual choices, such as the headscarf or sexual orientation, "without regard to what those preferences may be", and an overwhelming majority, with a rate of 92%, expressed support for the statement "The state has an obligation to protect its citizens against discrimination and harassment they might suffer because of their preferences"...

An interesting question, which implies that norms are appropriated do not suggest a passing fad, delves into notions of morality. This question is an important one, because 69% of the society thought that rights and freedoms may be restricted if they are not in keeping with public morality. While it is true that this approach involves a degree of conservatism, the underpinning of this approach is equally important. The trio of religion-faith-honor constitutes 25% of the responses to what morality means, while the choices referring to honesty and

respecting others add up to 51%. The significant difference here is not that one set of choices stems from religion, while the other from practices of life that may be considered more secular. The trio of religion-faith-honor represents a notion of morality that a respondent offers on the basis of his or her own belief...Honesty and respect, however, point to a definition of morality that centralizes our impact on others, and by extension the way we are perceived. Furthermore, responses that prioritize general social norms and traditions and imply that more flexibility is allowed in view of social change exceed 44%. This brings into mind that perceptions of morality are increasingly moving away from a categorical nature and towards becoming the natural ground of coexistence.

Perhaps these responses are more meaningful when they are considered along with the fact that 78.5% of the participants wanted “a constitution that the entire society participated in and reached a consensus on”. Such a constitution is expected to create the framework for a society that can coexist, which suggests that a moral ground that is aware of “the other” is a precondition.

5- RESTRICTED PLURALISM

One of the most noteworthy aspects of the study is that it includes questions that reveal how ideal norms can acquire a concrete character in people’s minds. There is more to the problem than imagining or asking that these norms be actualized. There needs to be notion of just “how” that will happen. It appears that the society in Turkey inclines towards dealing with this problem not through principled grounds, but by way of a pragmatic sharing mechanism. When they are associated with specific problems, the said ideals are observed to disappear all of a sudden, at which point the search for a solution in the short run, albeit temporary, is sought in a conflict-free medium. The pragmatic destination arrived at is one where pluralism is brought to the fore in areas in which there is no possibility of rupture and therefore no institutional damage is expected. This allows for offering a type of solution that is assumed to provide equal and fair opportunity for all, even though it does not fulfill everyone’s wishes.

A basic indicator of this is the “Grand National Assembly” response, offered by 56%, to the question “who should have the highest authority in ruling the country?”. At a time when the presidential system is being discussed and the chairman of AK Party, in his capacity as a leader, made explicit his intention in this respect, the general preference inclines toward the Grand National Assembly, which could be understood as a form of political opposition. It is interesting that people with Islamic sensitivities, who have a strong tendency to operate under the shadow of the Prime Minister when it comes to cultural and social issues, are able to display their diverging opinion in a strictly political matter. Considering this with alongside responses to general issues, this question could be interpreted as a sign that society in Turkey quit the practice of following a predominant leader as a matter of principle, but it prefers that a certain subject shoulder the responsibility in problematic areas. Nonetheless, we can at least say that there is a preference for a pluralist ground of legitimacy in principle.

In specific subject areas, the preference for pluralism gets noticeably stronger... There are two clear examples of this: The first is the question concerning how the Presidency of Religious Affairs should be structured. While 84.3% agreed that there should be room for the Presidency in the new constitution, only 15.6% of this group thought the institution should serve Sunnis only, while the remaining 84.4% agreed that “other sects and religions” should be served as well. Of the said 83.5%, however, only 17% supported that each community handle their respective religious affairs on their own. The 78.1% majority would like the Directorate to continue as an independent entity if it will not be designated in the constitution. In other words, pluralism is defended within a

specific institutional structure whose borderlines are clear with an approach that avoids going to the “edge” in principle. The borders of pluralism are demarcated where the guarantee for no-conflict and no-turmoil expires.

The second example relates to the courses covering religion and ethics... The society is divided between the choices “mandatory” and “elective” with respect to religion courses, and when the question inquires about the content to be offered, there is clearly major support (77%) for coverage of all religions and sects in addition to Sunni Islam. From the perspective of Sunnis, this response, it might be argued, corresponds to a sort of “contentment” originating from experience. In light of previous practices, it is obvious that the pluralization of the content offered in the religion course does not mean a genuine pluralism. However, it seems more appropriate to formulate the tendency here as “implementing the norm as long as it does not pose a threat”. Pluralism also serves a functional role in terms of preventing a potential clash and rupture. In other words, the fact that there would be coverage of all other sects and religions in a sense “dilutes” others; for instance Alevism, by integrating them into the “whole”. Where the question to inquire directly into “the coverage of Sunni and Alevi sects”, Sunnis would be more likely to be disturbed and opt for the “Sunni sect” only. Thus, we can conclude that we are witnessing an implicit assumption that pluralism can be experienced only under some form of control and surveillance.

6- RISK-AVOIDANCE AND DEFENSIVENESS

Considering the capacity of desires to transform into norms, one could have expected the said ideals to lead to more specific attitudes, at least in some concrete situations. But it seems that there is no progress above and beyond pluralism and there exists a huge heap of worries that demarcates the borders of this pluralism. These are worries ranging from “let us avoid actions that create unpleasantness” to fears of separation, dissolution and commotion. It appears that in areas which we have assumed to have been taken care of or reached a consensus on, the majority adopts a “risk-avoiding” approach. Yet, it slides into a “defensive” position in critical areas where there are concerns about rupturing and it is difficult to find any remedy save for calling the state to help.

The most noticeable example of the risk-avoiding approach is that 74% required “approval by the Grand National Assembly and in a referendum in order for the new constitution to come into effect”. This, however, is a preference based on practical reasons and does not have much of an ideological undertone. Yet similar attitudes may surface in areas that appear to be quite ideological. For example, 50.6% responded that “laïcité should be retained as-is in the constitution”. One might have expected a higher percentage to support the choice that implied “pluralism”; that is “the constitution should make reference to laïcité, but the concept should be redefined in a way in which the state would maintain equal distance to all religions”. The problem here is the implication of a pluralism that would transform the state rather than protect it. Thus, it could be argued that this “redefinition” is being perceived as a risk. In addition, the 69.7% support for “military service is compulsory, everyone must perform this obligation” might be representing both risk-avoidance and that being in military no longer means what it once did. Another sign illustrating the risk-avoiding approach is the statement “when there is no consensus among organs of the state”, the Constitutional Court must have the ultimate decision making power, which received the highest amount of support (44%). This is an approach that implies a state of mind based on continuity and constancy of the state and fearful of the whims of politicians. As a matter of fact, 39% favored the choice that Grand National Assembly should have the ultimate authority, while support for “government” making the final decision stayed at 17%. Similar to the question on laïcité, this question also insinuates that the limits of pluralism have been reached. The highest amount of support is offered for the

Constitutional Court; the entity expected to represent impartiality and play an arbiter role, which is a direct bearer of the “state” as opposed to the Grand National Assembly that is the representative of pluralism.

An interesting comparison can be drawn between questions inquiring into the situation of “those who suffer from pressure within the group to which they belong” and the course of action to be taken “if rights and freedoms are exercised for hateful purposes”. At first sight, these questions appear to be addressing very different areas, but they play a guiding role in terms of the risk-avoidance/defensiveness dilemma. Responses to the former question demand intervention by the state at a rate of 85%. Responses to the latter also say (with a high 82%) that rights and freedoms should to be restricted in such cases. Active intervention by the state is demanded in both questions, but in the context of the first one, the individual is passive, while in the second, he is active. In the case of group pressure, the state is to protect the individual, while in the case of hateful discourse, it should protect the public order. While the two responses might appear to be contradictory in terms of democratic values, they are in fact quite consistent when considered in terms of another concern: The majority of the people support the expansion of citizens’ rights and freedoms, but predicates that upon the maintenance of public order. This allows for an imagination in which the state is a subject both ensuring expansion of rights and one that restricts them.

The Kurdish issue is the area where the defensive approach is most visible... 85% of the respondents said Turkish should be the official national language. In parallel with this response, 73% said Turkish should be the only “language of instruction in formal education”. We might think that the most recent discourse employed by AK Party influenced these responses. However, the high rates show that Kurds’ demands are being considered in the parameters of the concern to “maintain public order” rather than within criteria relating to rights and freedoms. This causes the general public to retreat to a politically conservative and defensive position.

7- INHABITING CONTRADICTIONS

When the responses obtained in the study are put side by side, they may be interpreted as people having obvious inherent contradictions with respect to several areas. Such an interpretation would actually be based on the fact that we would be employing one and the same perspective towards both questions, while groups in society imagine very different concerns and slip into various approaches when it comes to the two questions. Nevertheless, both the desires and concerns have a real character, and the concerns are of various categories depending on the extent to which public order is affected.

For instance, when the question “who should have the highest authority and power” is considered alongside “who must have the ultimate decision making power when there is no consensus among organs of the state”, we encounter a situation that is hard to explain: While the preference is for the Grand National Assembly to have the highest authority and power, it is for the Constitutional Court when there is no consensus. Even though the first question does not offer Constitutional Court among possible choices, we can predict on the basis of the questions dealing with norms and ideals that even if the Constitutional Court choice was available, the Grand National Assembly would still have been preferred by the highest percentage and Constitutional Court would have been preferred the least. What is seemingly a contradiction here is that while the first question implies a “normal” order, the second one highlights “conflict”. It is observed while the majority of the society is expressing its desires and ideas in situations, it considers “normal”, they choose to be precautious in the face of conflicts and ruptures and move away from the norms it previously proposed. This observation explains why the conflict is a thing “that must be avoided” for society and how this became an acute cause of concern for society in Turkey, resulting in statist tendencies.

This approach, which seeks remedy from the state when fears are on the rise, develops a degree of “tolerance” in more neutral circumstances and adopts a stance to the tune of “let us avoid actions that create unpleasantness”. The statement “The constitution must be in harmony with universal principles and the international agreements Turkey is a party to, and there should be no exceptions in this regard” received clear support, with 75% favoring it. On the other hand, support for “The constitution should make reference to the principles, reforms and nationalism of Atatürk” reaches 82.3%. Even a somewhat “soft” proposal like “It is alright if Ankara were not the capital city” is rejected by 68.8% of the respondents. One interpretation of this could have been that society thinks principles and nationalism of Atatürk are compatible with international agreements and universal principles. However, both the experience of the last decade in Turkey and the question on Ankara imply that there is a different perspective behind the responses. It seems that although many people are aware of the contradiction between these statements, they make a distinction between the ideal and the actual situations and do not have a problem with compromising the ideal at the expense of avoiding conflict.

This finding emphasizes that there is a gray area in the society’s mental background that reflects how concerns and responses take shape depending on the perceptions. Consistency is no longer the objective at this point; the aim is to avoid situations that trigger anxiety. While expressing responses that are consistent with one another at the level of norms, under pressure from actual situations and issues, the society does not have a problem with slipping into obviously contradictory positions.

8- RUPTURES

However, it seems that several different issues cannot be passed over lightly by just carrying on these contradictions as it is feared, we see that the society is split into two in regards to these issues. This split rests upon cultural identities as a whole in many cases.

The Kurdish issue is at the heart of these ruptures naturally. Whether elected local governments can legislate additional taxes to be effective in their respective jurisdictions only, or whether elected governments may provide educational and public services in people’s mother tongue or in local languages can lead to quite obvious ruptures. While the level of agreement; 33.5%, in the first question might generate optimism, the level of disagreement is 48.5%, and that is a sign that we are facing a tough problem. When it comes to the provision of educational and public services in local languages, agreement is at 40% and disagreement is at 45%. In the case of the election threshold, which is a more political issue, agreement with a 4 percent threshold is 5 points below the disagreement (37% to 42%). The picture becomes much clearer when it comes to an ideological matter; the issue of making reference to ethnic identities in the constitution... But it is first of all necessary to note that there is only 9% support for no reference to any ethnic identity in the constitution at all. This percentage could be interpreted as a sign that the society in Turkey has not taken the mental initiative implied by the democratic perspective; it continues to seek universal norms within its own patriarchal world and believes that it could undertake this search only on negotiated grounds. Looking at the other responses, we see that the percentage of respondents who would like the constitution to refer only to Turkish identity is 23 points above that of respondents who said “all ethnic identities should be referred to in the constitution” (56% to 33%). Considering this picture overall, we can suggest that the Kurdish question involves a series of issues ranging from governing practices to politics, and from there to ideology, and that as one moves closer to ideology, the defensive approach is on the rise. It is additionally useful to underline that the percentage favored by freedom-prone perspectives that support a solution should not be underestimated. There is no doubt that a precondition to these perspectives acquiring a prevailing character is the government’s leadership role.

However, one should not brush aside the likelihood that the ruptures and divisions might have a tendency to ossify.

Ruptures can be encountered when one moves beyond the Kurdish issue, as well... Each of the two options (mandatory or elective) concerning courses on religion and ethics received about equal support (50.1% and 46.3%, respectively). Once again, it is possible to lament that there is so little support for the abolishing of these courses altogether (3.6%) or be hopeful that support for an elective religion and ethics course is nearly 50%, despite the fact that the Alevi population is smaller in numbers.

A similar rupture is also observed in the context of the questions where concerns about preserving the state are emphasized. The proposition “The judiciary should be able to side with the state and against the individual when the reputation and interest of the state are at stake” found support from 45%, while 38% opposed it. Considering this together with questions indicating that individual rights and freedoms are embraced at very high rates, it could be asserted that society could not really distance itself from a citizenship model that does not offend the state.

9- THE STATE AND SELF-CONFIDENCE

If we are to think about what this study means as a whole, we can offer the following:

As a result of global adaptation and the mental transformation of the last two decades, the society in Turkey now appears to be able to imagine a democratic country, society and state in terms of norms and ideals.

However, society employs pragmatic criteria and does not proceed on the basis of principles when it comes to norms and ideals bearing upon specific issues and questions. As such, it prefers opening up a room for pluralism in the existing structure, rather than supporting a restructuring.

The borders of pluralism are drawn based on the assessment of whether or not pluralism will create a likelihood of conflict, and where it does imply such a danger, the society opts for restriction, and that of the state.

In restricting norms and ideals, a risk-avoiding or defensive position is taken depending on the weight of the contemplated threat, and the higher the concern, the more defensive assumed positions become.

The contradictions between norms and ideals on the one hand, and restrictions and reliance on the state, on the other, are generally not regarded as problematic, but rather as manifestations of reality.

In cases where this realism comes up against the demands of the society, the emerging ruptures suggest that the society is split in the middle, and in most instances, these ruptures lead to specific cultural groups clustering across a single line as a whole.

These inferences suggest that the fear of conflict and the corresponding notion of order provide a solid interpretative framework that constitutes the background of all questions. In cases where there are no threats, and rights and freedoms are defined without pressure; there is an expectation to restrict the state as much as possible or to render it functional in service of the citizens. And yet, when there is a perception of threat which pertains to public stability and order, the state itself emerges as a subject and transforms into an asset that must be safeguarded. As several responses imply, the decision to value the state to such extent stems from the need to retain an arbiter available. Thus it is preferred that steps toward pluralism are taken within or under the

supervision of the state. Pluralism, which the state is being asked to embrace, might in fact be a search for self-confidence if we look at the issue in a wider context. The state is valuable to the extent it makes up for the absence of this self-confidence. In that situation, it may be suggested that the society in Turkey is heading toward the future still from within a longing for the Ottoman dream. Yet, it merges that the concept of a state will be the bearer of universal norms, serve as an arbiter and resolve conflicts.

10- WHAT ABOUT THE CONSTITUTION?

Based on the data gathered in this field study, we can argue that the most critical matter in regards to the constitutional process is the Kurdish issue, and the society desires a durable solution in the form of a constitution. In addition, we need to emphasize that the ruling party bears a huge weight in terms of reaching that desired solution because they alone have the impact to orient particularly social ruptures towards a certain direction.

On the other hand, while the society perceives itself as deserving of “full-fledged and advanced” democracy ideally, we realize that it is not yet ready for that transformation and may only set out on that path in parallel with the transformation of the state; in other words, by preserving the state. Thus, looking at it realistically, the new constitution will be likely to have a greater democratic character than its predecessors did; there will be broad social support for that character. Yet, it will not be easy to reach the standards of any given developed western country.

Furthermore, we also face the question of how democratic it would be to have such an expectation... In this context, being democratic means a going through a process in which it is necessary for individuals to convince each other by talking openly about their demands and preferences. It is then possible that such a process may not be able to create a “full-fledged and advanced” democratic framework with respect to rights and freedoms, or in terms of the structure and operations of the state, given conditions of present day.

Even the existence of the need for a new constitution and the envisioning of that need are signs that society has moved to a different mental phase. But, in a society whose self-confidence is shattered to such a great extent, how realistic or healthy is it to transition to an altogether new order in a single leap and by way of a break? That is another question...

On Monitoring the New Constitutional Process Project

The authoritarian and statist structure of the 1982 Constitution is at the root of the majority of current political and social problems in Turkey. A new constitution is required to solve the country's decades-old problems, reinforce the rule of law, and protect human rights and individual freedoms. The process to make the new constitution to address the country's problems was launched at the initiative of the Speaker of Turkish Grand National Assembly in the aftermath of the general election held on 12 June 2011. Three members from each of the political parties in the Grand National Assembly (AK Party, BDP, CHP and MHP) were appointed to form the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission, and upon completing process of collecting input and feedback from the public in Turkey, the Commission is currently working on a draft of the constitution. Monitoring the Constitutional process represents TESEV Democratization Program's effort to monitor, document and report on the making of a new constitution in Turkey. As part of this monitoring effort, the positions, approaches and interests of the parliament and political parties, media and non-governmental organizations are being monitored, and the mechanisms of the process, the context, as well as the outputs of the debate are being scrutinized.

As part of this effort, monitoring reports, which assess the new constitutional process and its actors, are published periodically. Authored by Levent Köker, Ferhat Kentel and Özge Genç, the monitoring report titled «New Constitutional Process Monitoring Report» evaluates the process between October 2011 and January 2012. The second report was authored by Ferhat Kentel, Mehmet Uçum, Levent Köker and Özge Genç. It reviewed the positions adopted by the civil society, political actors and the media in regards to the new constitutional process between February and June 2012, and at the same time discussed the opinions and suggestions furnished by non-governmental organizations and entities to the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission. All of the reports may be accessed at the www.tesev.org.tr website. Levent Köker and Abbas Kılıç are currently writing the third report. In light of the list of reservations and statements of Turkey in international agreements it is party to, that report will be calling attention to Turkey's position vis-à-vis rights accorded under international law.

Periodically released chronological information, brief/extended analyses and commentaries on the making of the constitution are available at the Turkish-language ANALİZ (www.anayasaizleme.org) and English-language Turkey Constitution Watch (www.turkeyconstitutionwatch.org) websites created as part of the Monitoring the Constitution project. Nearly all of the opinions and suggestions submitted to the parliament by NGOs and civil society can be accessed at these websites. As 2012 draws to a close, the present public opinion survey, conducted at a time when the making of the constitution is at a critical turn, aimed to reveal society's expectations from the constitution and to also explore people's views on issues that are difficult to reach a consensus on.

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