



Turkey and Europe after Nice Summit

Introduction

While European Union attitudes on a possible Turkish accession are the subject of these reflections, the title is taken from President Turgut Özal. He used to tell those close to him that Turkey will either be at the table in Europe as a full member or it will find itself on the menu (Makovsky, 1999, 92). The Turkish perspective encapsulated in both parts of this aphorism also provides a good starting point for West and East Europeans interested in what is at stake.

Full membership is today more important than it was when Turgut Özal revived Turkish ambitions to join the European Communities. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem frequently tells us that membership of the European Union is one of the two priorities of Turkey. At the same time, Turkish spokesmen like to hint that, if this legitimate ambition is denied, Turkey has more alternatives than in Özal's time and than are presently available to Central and East European states. Today's variant of President Özal's option of an American road to Westernisation is that of regional 'strategic partner' to the United States. The Americans no longer subsidise the Turkish army, but they do appreciate Turkey's potential role in the Caspian, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, and with Israel. Four different options are implicit in İsmail Cem's responses to the EU denial of Turkish candidacy at its 1997 Luxembourg Council. By visiting Moscow, he made the point that Turkey might work with Russia as a fellow-outsider or, contrariwise, confront the Russian federation over Caspian oil and the Caucasus. Cem also spoke of Turkey as the 'bridge' between Europe and Asia, a veiled reference both to Prime Minister Erbakan's enthusiasm for the conservative Organisation of Islamic countries and to a more radical Islamic solidarity. Yet another model in fashion with both Nationalist and Islamic leaders is Japan. This evokes analogies with interwar Japan's aggressive strategy after it felt it had not been treated as an equal. Finally, it would have been unthinkable for Özal's ambassador to London to suggest an alternative to Atatürk's commitment to Turkey's borders, the foundation of 'Peace Abroad'. On 12 June, 2001, Ambassador Korkmaz Haktanır gave a



speech in Northern Cyprus that floated the future possibility of a new Union of Turkish Republics, which might include 'others' besides Turkey and the TRNC.

As for a lesser status within the EU than that of membership, being on the menu is not attractive. Turks of all persuasions do not want to be an agenda item to be discussed by others already at, or joining, the table. WEU Associate status, membership of the Customs Union, signing up to Conventions that might protect dissident minorities, are only acceptable so long as they contribute to realizing the objective of equal membership. Cem said on 6 July 1998, 'We are tired of having a special status in our relations with the EU' (Anadolu Agency, 8 July 1998). He was willing to attend the European Conference in 2000 after the EU had recognized Turkey's candidacy, not when it was proffered in 1997 as a substitute for candidacy.

Before looking at the relationship between the EU and Turkey during and after the Nice summit of EU leaders, it is useful to set out the terms of the Helsinki summit's agreement that it was up to Turkey as a sovereign state to reform itself in line with the conditions demanded of all candidates for membership. In December 1999, Cem was one of the Turkish leaders who accepted the assurances offered by Javier Solana, Günther Verheugen, and Jaako Blomberg. Greece and Sweden had withdrawn the objections that they had maintained at their previous summit in Cologne to German insistence that a multicultural Europe could not discriminate against Turkey on geographic, historical or religious grounds (IEP,2001, 23). Mr Bülent Ecevit's letter to Chancellor Schröder of May 26, 1999 had agreed that Turkey 'must first fulfill the general accession criteria set down in 1993 in the Copenhagen EU summit and meet the obligations in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 before negotiations can begin' (Steinbach, 2001). If this quotation is accurate, this level of conditionality is more demanding than for other candidates. In their case, negotiations started before they were judged to have fully met the criteria set out at Copenhagen and Madrid. Moreover, the Amsterdam treaty had strengthened Member States' obligations towards the environment and human rights. Nevertheless, Helsinki opened the door for eventual full membership negotiations in good faith, and an immediate process of EU aid, advice, and the joint setting of timetabled objectives in an



Accession Partnership modeled on that of other candidates for membership. The EU had moved on from seeking a stable relationship with Turkey short of membership (Brewin, 2000, 18).

This paper discusses some aspects of the Turkish accession process from the perspective of the European Union. PART ONE focuses on three issues that disturbed elite and public opinion in Turkey during the Member States negotiations over the Nice treaty of December 2000. It seeks to explain why Turkey was the only candidate not assigned votes in the Council and seats in the European Parliament in the future enlarged Union, and why Turkey was excluded from the decision-making process for the EU Rapid Reaction Force despite its substantial offer of 5000 troops. Thirdly, it explains why Cyprus became included in the short-term aims of the framework Association Partnership, despite assurances that discussion between the EU and Turkey on this sensitive matter should for the immediate future be outside the public domain.

PART TWO focuses on the lack of urgency over Turkish membership shown by the Commission, Parliament, Member State delegations and think-tanks. It is not enough to say that European public opinion has become hostile to enlargement in general and to Turkey in particular. The fact that Germany was unpopular with its neighbours did not prevent elites signing the treaties of Paris and Rome, and building a new Community on the basis of a permissive public opinion that wanted peace between Germany and its neighbours to take institutional form. Nor is it enough to say that the list of economic, political and administrative problems to be overcome by Turkey is so long that serious work on Turkish accession can wait until Turkey has reformed itself. Greece, Spain and Portugal became members well before they could demonstrate a good record in human rights, in administrative efficiency and economic competitiveness, and without first solving their disputes over Gibraltar and Cyprus.

PART THREE develops this theme by arguing against the consensus that the conditionality which has been successful in transforming Central and Eastern Europe can also be successful in the case of Turkey. The CONCLUSION reviews the policy options



for the EU by categorizing them according to their proposed timing. They may be summarized as

- 1) Membership never, due to Cyprus dispute.
- 2) Membership later, once Turkey meets all the conditions, with or without a new interim Observer status in the Council.
- 3) Membership early, with long derogations.

PART ONE

1a) The Nice Summit: institutions for an enlarged European Union

At Amsterdam the Member States had failed to agree how they would in future be represented in the Council, the Parliament and the Commission. At Nice the French Presidency succeeded in winning agreement on how votes in the Council and seats in the Parliament would be distributed, as set out in the table below. As for the appointment of Commissioners by Member States, it is of relevance to Turkey that after 2005 the larger states will lose their right to appoint two Commissioners. Once the Union has 27 members, a rotation system 'reflecting the demographic and geographic range' will reduce the number of Commissioners to less than the number of states. A limit of 350 members caps the Committee of the Regions and also the Economic and Social Committee. In an EU of 27 members each of these two Committees will comprise 344 representatives. The admission of Turkey will require a redistribution.

Dr Best's table showing shares of population, Council votes and seats in the Parliament

	Population		Present vote Future vote				Present seats Future s			
Germany	82.0	17.0%	10	11.5%	29	8.4%	99	15.8%	99	13.5%
UK	59.2	12.3%	10	11.5%	29	8.4%	87	13.9%	72	9.8%
France	59.0	12.3%	10	11.5%	29	8.4%	87	13.9%	72	9.8%
Italy	57.6	12.0%	10	11.5%	29	8.4%	87	13.9%	72	9.8%
Spain	39.4	8.2%	8	9.2%	27	7.8%	64	10.2%	50	6.8%
Poland	38.7				27	7.8%			50	6.8%
Romania	22.5	4.7%			14	4.1%			33	4.5%
Netherlands	15.8	3.3%	5	5.7%	13	3.8%	31	5.0%	25	3.4%
Greece	10.5	2.2%	5	5.7%	12	3.5%	25	4.0%	22	3.0%
Czech Rep.	10.3	2.1%			12	3.5%			20	2.7%
Belgium	10.2	2.1%	5	5.7%	12	3.5%	25	4.0%	22	3.0%
Hungary	10.1	2.1%			12	3.5%			20	2.7%
Portugal	10.0	2.1%	5	5.7%	12	3.5%	25	4.0%	22	3.0%
Sweden	8.9	1.8%	4	4.6%	10	2.9%	22	3.5%	18	2.5%
Bulgaria	8.2	1.7%			10	2.9%			17	2.3%
Austria	8.1	1.7%	4	4.6%	10	2.9%	21	3.4%	17	2.3%
Slovakia	5.4	1.1%			7	2.0%			13	1.8%
Denmark	5.3	1.1%	3	3.4%	7	2.0%	16	2.6%	13	1.8%
Finland	5.2	1.1%	3	3.4%	7	2.0%	16	2.6%	13	1.8%
Ireland	3.7	0.8%	3	3.4%	7	2.0%	15	2.4%	12	1.6%
Lithuania	3.7	0.8%			7	2.0%			12	1.6%
Latvia	2.4	0.5%			4	1.2%			8	1.1%
Slovenia	2.0	0.4%			4	1.2%			7	1.0%
Estonia	1.4	0.3%			4	1.2%			6	0.8%
Cyprus	0.8	0.2%			4	1.2%			6	0.8%
Luxembourg	0.4	0.1%	2	2.3%	4	1.2%	6	1.0%	6	0.8%
Malta	0.4	0.1%			3	0.9%			5	0.7%
TOTAL	481.2		87		345		626		732	

Source:EIPASCOPE 2001/1, p.4

Turkey is the only candidate country omitted from this table of the EU27 (15 Member States plus the 12 candidates negotiating treaties of accession). According to the French Presidency, leaving Turkey out did not constitute discrimination. Switzerland and Norway were also excluded, and they are the most popular candidates in EU polls. All three countries were excluded from the calculations because none of them for different



reasons are currently negotiating accession treaties. Therefore no decisions were yet needed on their future votes in the Council, and the number of seats to which they would be entitled in the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Regional Committee.

Turkey's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were invited on the same basis as other candidates to Nice for the opening dinner and the group photograph. The same courtesy was extended to Switzerland, also called a candidate country in the Council's press release. Turkey, unlike neutral Switzerland, accepted the invitation to the European Conference held at ministerial level on 27 November and at head of state level on 7 December.

It is true that the omission of Turkey could have been avoided by using general formulae applicable to all potential members. If Europe were to give itself a bicameral federal Constitution, the sovereignty principle might be recognized by a formula giving each state the same number of votes irrespective of size. The democratic principle might be met by a formula relating seats in a House of Representatives to size of population. However, in the EU as it is, the Parliament has never been sufficiently powerful to satisfy the democratic principle; consequently the distribution of votes in the Council has always been based on a rough and ready compromise between statehood and the democratic principle that the numbers of citizens must somehow count. Therefore, it can reasonably be said that the procedure of according votes and seats to named countries was that used in the treaty of Rome and all subsequent accession treaties.

Another example of a possible formula is that of the double-majority formula, whereby legislation would be approved by a specified majority of states so long as the majority represented a majority of the European Union's population. At Nice the smaller states rejected this formula precisely because it favoured the larger states.

The source of the problem is that each state has a veto on new treaties. Luxembourg would not give up its six MEPs for a hypothetical prospect of accommodating Turkey one day. The French Presidency itself used its power of veto so that a France of 59 millions retains parity in the Council with the new Germany of 82 million citizens. For Turkey the

implications can be read both positively and negatively. Positively, after accession it can expect the same number of votes as the other large states; negatively, its greater population will not entitle Turkey to more votes than France. At Nice, Germany agreed to be compensated by retaining all its present 99 seats in the Parliament, which in turn meant an immediate breach of the 700-member ceiling established as recently as May 2000 when the treaty of Amsterdam came into force. Negotiations at the highest level were so difficult that the conference was extended for an extra day; a special Franco-German summit had to be called to assuage German bitterness at the outcome.

Another aspect of the use of precedent was the exclusion of all candidate countries from the discussion even though what was being decided would affect them. In this respect Turkey was treated no differently than the others. However this exclusion from participation affected Turkey more than those other candidates that could rely on ties of kinship or religion or geography with a particular Member State. A Declaration at Nice promised a more inclusive procedure for the future: all candidate states will be associated with the process in ways to be determined in December 2001 at Laeken. At the next IGC in 2004, accession states will participate as of right, presumably with the right to speak but not vote or veto. However, this provision underlined a new discrimination in favour of those states close to accession. At the Gothenberg summit in June 2001, the future timetable envisages that accession states will comprise ten states with a total population of 75 million in the first wave (Verheugen, 2001). That leaves out Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, with a combined population of 95 million.

By avoiding the difficulty of accommodating Europe's second most populous country, the EU 15 aroused Turkish sensitivity about European 'sincerity'. Narrowly construing the 'future us' to mean only those candidates in negotiations implied that Member States did not envisage Turkish accession in the foreseeable future. In Turkey this perception contributed to the delay in the adoption of the Turkish National Programme from December 2000 to March 2001, and probably emasculated its content. The same charge of discrimination against Turkey became associated with the second major achievement of the French Presidency at Nice, the development of an EU military decision-making



capacity, a subject of particular significance for the Turkish army, the second largest in Europe.

1b) The treaty of Nice: Common European Security and Defence Policy

Article 25 of the treaty of Nice established a Political and Security Committee composed of national officials at ambassadorial level from the EU15. The Member States appointed Javier Solana as chairman by common consent, the same procedure they use to appoint the President of the Commission. The PSC has responsibility for the Common European Security and Defence Policy: in any situation where Washington decides not to commit American troops, the PSC can autonomously deploy European troops. This built on the agreement at the 1999 Helsinki Council to create a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men by 2003. The Nice treaty repeated the offer of 'dialogue, consultation and cooperation' with European non-member states made at the June 2000 Council at Santa Maria da Feira. In mid-November, 2000, the 15 Member States, plus the twelve accession candidates, plus Turkey, Norway and Iceland as members of NATO, (EU + 15) met at a Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels. Fourteen Member States of the EU, (with Denmark opting out), offered 100,000 military personnel, enabling rotation of troops during the year of commitment. The German total was 13,500 and the UK 12,500. Turkey committed itself to 5000 troops, the biggest contribution from outside the EU (Terriff et al, 2001, 4). The Nice summit gave military chiefs of the EU15 six months to establish a Military Committee and an EU military staff in the Avenue Cortenbourg to prepare sufficient resources, including resources assigned to NATO. However, the EU15 were determined that only Member States would decide the aims of any peacekeeping operation, assign national assets and appoint commanders. The treaty of Rome makes no provision for 'observer' status, perhaps in order to preclude American requests for the right to participate. (By unanimous approval of the members, outsiders such as Norwegians on Schengen matters, or Turks on Balkan matters, can be invited to attend any discussion. They have no right to attend unless invited.)



This determination sidelined the six European members of NATO who were not members of the European Union. Their discomfiture was all the greater because the creation of these new EU institutions necessarily devalued the role assigned since 1991 to the Western European Union. As Associate Members of WEU these six had the right to participate in WEU Council discussions and operations (15 +6). Turkey had several reasons for being more dismayed than, say, Norway. It was one of the two European countries to increase its military expenditure after 1989, the other being Greece. It had a long-term commitment to increasing the flexibility and firepower of its forces. Its geographical position made it a likely participant in all but two of the 22 areas deemed sensitive by the WEU. It had reason to think that neutral EU countries like Sweden and Ireland, and future member states like Cyprus, would join Greece in excluding Turkey from operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. When the Belgian Presidency offered reassurance to Ankara in November 2001, Greece publicly expressed dissent (AA News, 30 November). Turkey was uneasy about the possible role of British bases in Cyprus in the training and deployment of a European force. Turkish sensitivity was enhanced by its experience of Anglo-Saxon decision-making in the Gulf War, where it found itself faced with a costly embargo and unwelcome incursions of Kurdish refugees.

In defending what it saw as its national interests, Turkey had a lever in its legal powers of veto over assigning NATO assets for use by the Rapid Reaction Force, powers reiterated at the 1999 April summit in Washington. The former Director of Chatham House, Sir Timothy Garden complained that 'Turkey is playing its NATO veto card early as part of its somewhat contradictory strategy towards EU membership' (Garden, 2001, 7). Some American hawks supported Turkish concern at the implicit decoupling from NATO, the duplication of resources, and the discrimination against powerful members of NATO. The European states in the EU and in NATO treated Turkish objections as serious but not critical. They were unable to reach a consensus that over this issue they could allow Turkey the right to participate in the preparatory work and in future decision-making. The continuation of Anglo-Saxon bombing of Iraq, the French Assembly resolution on Armenia, and Greece's claims to jurisdiction over their territorial waters contributed to



dissatisfaction in Turkey. On 18 January 2001 the Anatolian News Agency cited 'serious frictions over NATO' in explaining the postponement of President Chirac's projected visit. The Franco-German TIGRE helicopter was dropped from Turkey's rearmament programme; on 11 February Alcatel and Matro Marconi were banned for a year from tendering on Turkish projects. The Chief of Staff cancelled his visits to France. Turkey rejected a Dutch compromise in March and British proposals in June (Tocci, 2001,p.12). At a military seminar on 11 January 2001, General Nahit Senogul said that no EU country supported Turkey's membership in the EU, and some were always included in activities against Turkey (Cumhuriyet). General Halil Simsek said that 'Turkey has not been accepted as a full member of the EU because it is a Muslim country.' Turkey should stand by its national commitments to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

1c) The Turkish Accession Partnership and Cyprus

The letter from the Finnish Presidency delivered to Ankara during the Helsinki summit is not in the public domain. The Anatolian Agency of 20 July 2001 reports Mr Ecevit as saying that the three EU representatives

'saw how sensitive we were about some foreign issues and national matters...they flew to Ankara by a private plane at midnight and said words which meant they would not make us uneasy about these issues.'

It seems that the Turkish leaders agreed to discuss Cyprus in private, but that this issue would not be included among the short-term aims to be included in the Accession Partnership. Turkish sensitivity on Cyprus can be gauged by the fact that in November 2001, the National Assembly held its tenth secret session devoted to Cyprus. Mr Ecevit was himself Prime Minister in 1974 when Turkish troops landed in Cyprus, thereby in his view solving the problem. At the time of writing, in November 2001, both the EU and Turkey have apparently hardened their positions over Cyprus. The Commission President, Mr Prodi, has paid a visit to Nicosia to announce that the Republic of Cyprus will be first in line for accession. Mr Cem threatened that the Turkish response will be radical. Mr Ecevit spoke of integration into Turkey, or an autonomous status for Northern Cyprus



within Turkey. It is difficult to see how Turkey could remain a member of the Customs Union after carrying through another Cypriot 'change of borders without consent of all parties'. Like Japan in the thirties, a Turkey forced back on nationalist self-reliance might well become expansionist on behalf of Turks or Moslems outside its present frontiers. Commissioner Verheugen hoped that Turkey will not pay a higher price than in the past for its support of Northern Cyprus (AA News, 18 November,2001), but it is more likely that Turkey's political and military leaders will rely on patriotic support for the Turks of Northern Cyprus, risking business interests in Europe, and the distant prospect of EU membership.

To return to the Turkish perception of European bad faith over Cyprus during the French Presidency, the institutions of Council, Commission and Parliament all have grounds for claiming that they met their obligations by overcoming internal dissent to produce the Accession Partnership envisaged at the Helsinki summit. Internal dissent over Turkey's place in Europe was most obvious in the Parliament. The Morillon Report tabled on 19 October 2000 is a composite of tepid praise and fierce criticism. It pre-empts two of Turkey's stronger cards by claiming that 'geopolitical and strategic considerations must not be decisive in negotiations'. It draws attention to democratization, human rights and the situation of minorities. It criticizes some of Turkey's actions, such as the bombing of Kenkador in August 2000. The text lists two dozen demands, including support for the Armenian minority and the withdrawal of occupation forces from Cyprus. The explanatory statement includes the claim that it is 'for the European Parliament to tell the Turkish people that there are, today, at least three conditions for accession which Turkey must meet...on the rights and obligations of minorities, ..Cyprus...reducing the influence of the Turkish army in the drawing up of political decisions'. The Seppänen report of 17 October on extending European Investment Bank financing to Turkey concludes that 'the consolidation of democracy and human rights' will have to be reflected in EIB financing. Yet, despite the unusual antipathy for a candidate exposed in such remarks, on 14 February, 2001 the Parliament did adopt the Swoboda Report accepting the Framework Regulation establishing the legal basis of the Accession Partnership.

The Commission, for its part upgraded its Turkey desk. When it reluctantly acceded to Turkey's request that Alain Servantie be removed for writing to the PKK, it appointed Michael Leigh at the higher level of deputy Director-General. The Commission's third 'Regular Report' on Turkey issued in 2000 combined toughness with tact. Much of the summary is harsh: 'Turkey still does not meet the political Copenhagen criteria... The economic, social and cultural rights situation has not improved...' Yet the Commission avoided confrontation with Mr Ecevit's government over Cyprus. In the main body of the report (1.3), negotiations under the aegis of the UN were reported in factual terms. The issue was omitted completely from the summary; thus the Cyprus issue was also omitted from the summaries reproduced in the Commission's manual on enlargement, Strategy Paper 2000. In line with the Presidency promise to Mr Ecevit, and after discussion with Ankara, progress on the Cyprus issue was not included among the short-term objectives of the draft framework regulation sent to the Council on 26 July. When Greece proposed to add a clause on Cyprus, the Commission asked the Member States to delete the amendment as Turkey was fulfilling its promise to discuss sensitive issues out of the public eye (see AA News of 24 January 2001).

However, twelve states in the Council overrode the Commission's objections by supporting the Greek amendment in the Accession Partnership sent to Parliament for its assent. The clause required Turkey in the period up to the end of 2001 to

'...strongly support, in the context of [internal European] political dialogue, the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to a successful conclusion.'

To the Council this wording was the minimum necessary to get the Parliament's assent. It would help protect the Greek Government from Greek electors, and reassure the Greek Cypriot Government that the accession process with Turkey was not dissociated from the Cyprus question. The context of political dialogue between Member States and Turkey denuded the reference of practical effect: political dialogue is held in private and does not require the presence of other candidate countries. The commitment to the UN process was in line with the section on 'principles' in the Accession Partnership, which repeats

both the general clause on dispute settlement taken from Paragraph 4 of the Helsinki Conclusions and the specific reference to Cyprus from Paragraph 9. Including the clause was in line with the Member States' own internal consensus behind the established UN route to a settlement between the two Cypriot communities. It is likely that progress on Cyprus was also a condition of the financial help afforded Turkey after the two financial crises of 2001. In legal terms, the Presidency letter of December 1999 was not part of the Community acquis. On March 7 the Council approved the Accession Partnership without further discussion as soon as it received the Parliament's assent.

To Mr Ecevit's government, the military members of the National Security Council, and the Turkish press, the Council's demands on Cyprus were treated as a breach of promise. The National Security Council in November 2000 had approved Mr Denktaş' withdrawal from the UN talks. The Turkish government announced that it might have to reassess its relations with the EU, thereby threatening to withdraw from the accession process. A year later, the Commission's 2001 Opinion included a paragraph on Cyprus in its Conclusions, citing Turkish support for Mr Denktaş' withdrawal from the UN talks. (Commission, 2001, p.97).

PART TWO

Attitudes of Member States to Turkish membership

The EU stance that membership was up to Turkey thus contributed to ambivalent responses from Turkey's leaders for whom EU membership was supposed to be a principal aim. The paucity in Member States of serious governmental, party, academic or think-tank reports is itself evidence of two perceptions with respect to Turkish membership. The first is lack of urgency, while waiting for Turkey to reform itself to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The second is that the opportunities and problems posed by Turkish membership are so vast and interlinked as to deter both serious reflection on the implications, and preparations to move public opinion in the Member States. This section discusses some of the points contained in surveys of the attitudes of the bigger and smaller states of the EU.



2a) The Five Large States (with 8-10 Council votes)

The German political elite is committed to enlargement. When Günther Verheugen, the German Commissioner for enlargement, suggested on 2/3 September 2000 a Europe-wide referendum to legitimise enlargement, this was rejected in Germany lest a negative result endanger their aim of embedding a reunified Germany in an enlarged Europe. Chancellor Helmut Kohl thought that this aim would also be endangered by simultaneously taking on a large, poor and Islamic country. Yet the single most important factor in shifting the EU stance on Turkish membership was the election of Chancellor Schröder in Germany. The German Presidency in the first half of 1999 included Turkey's candidature in the draft Conclusions of the Cologne summit. At the last minute, this was withdrawn in the face of opposition from Greece and Sweden (IEP, 2001,15).

This substantial change for the sake of multicultural consistency nevertheless did not amount to German sponsorship of early Turkish membership. The Christian Democrat Union's road-map, Europa 2010 (CDU), states that 'We cannot imagine membership of Turkey in the foreseeable future. Therefore it was a mistake to grant Turkey candidate status now'. The Liberals (FDP) statement On Turkey of 5 November 1999 agrees that this step was taken too early. The previous Social Democrat Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, continued publicly to oppose Turkish membership. In German newspapers and journals, Turkish membership is discussed on a 'for and against' basis that would never be applied to the Czech Republic. An example is Internationale Politik of March 16, 2001 in which Udo Steinbach makes the case that Helsinki put right the mistake at Luxembourg, while Peter Scholl-Latour argues that Turkish membership would mean a catastrophic loss of identity for both the European Union and Turkey. However, Udo Steinbach bases his advocacy on mutual interests, especially in security. This relegates the case for Turkey's European identity to a pragmatic argument that Turkey's membership will make the EU more attractive to Muslim countries outside Europe, and to some but not all the Muslims presently largely unrepresented in the EU institutions. He does not argue that Turks should at last enjoy their legal right to free movement in Europe according to the timetable established in the 1970 Additional Protocol.



France has been much less keen on enlargement to the East, perhaps out of concern for its taxpayers and farming interests. While insisting on a substantial increase in funding for Mediterranean non-members, including Turkey, France has not proposed opening up the Customs Union to Turkish agriculture. In line with Mme Mitterand's campaign for human rights in Turkey, the French Minister for European Affairs on 3 October, 2000 told the European Parliament that Turkey has to meet the Copenhagen criteria before the opening of negotiations. Insufficient respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms was an 'obstacle' to Turkish accession. The passage through the French Assembly of a resolution condemning the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman empire showed how widespread anti-Turkish feeling is in France. Arabs and Kurds in France have shown little Islamic solidarity with Turkey. Since the enlargement to Greece, Paris has demanded that candidate countries first demonstrate the administrative capacity to implement the *acquis*. During its EU Presidency, France was keen to begin the screening process to establish the compatibility of Turkish legislation with the Community *acquis*. In **Britain**, the Labour Party is ideologically suspicious of what it sees as Turkish militarism. Defence circles have not invoked Turkey's usefulness to a European Rapid Reaction Force. Human rights organizations keep cases of Turkish mistreatment of journalists and of Kurds in the public eye. The Cyprus issue is disproportionately important in the United Kingdom because of the sovereign bases, British tourists and residents. All political parties seek the votes of the large number of Cypriots in London. The Government of Cyprus is an active member of the Commonwealth. The UK advice to Turkish Cypriots to agree a settlement before accession has been called by Özdem Sanberk 'a tacit admission that the countries of Western Europe expect the Greek Cypriots to go for all-out confrontation once they are inside the Union' (Turkish Daily News, 21 February, 2001).

Italy has been the most optimistic supporter of early membership and, through Signor Dini, the most understanding of Turkey's case that there are two administrations in Cyprus. However, Greek sensitivities as a fellow Member are taken seriously, and membership for Croatia has greater priority than Turkey. Italy has not made an issue of



protecting its own Mediterranean producers, and has favoured active participation in promoting clearly established reforms in Turkey.

Spain has discretely followed a similar line, while taking the lead in protecting the level of existing cohesion funds it receives from Brussels, a level of funding which is incompatible with enlargement to Turkey.

2b) The Ten Smaller States - with 2-5 Council votes

Of the smaller EU states, the most remarkable change in attitude towards Turkey between the Councils of Luxembourg and Helsinki has been made by **Greece**. After experiencing unexpected isolation during the near-war over Imia/Kardak, Greece became more accommodating in the EU Council of Ministers. During the Kosovo crisis, the government accepted the constraints of international cooperation, repressing popular sympathy with Orthodox countries under attack. In the wake of Öcalan's capture, George Papandreou replaced Theodoros Pangalos as foreign minister. The Cyprus and Aegean issues became obstacles to neighbourly relations rather than grounds for a 'no appeasement' policy. The Turkish candidature was not an issue in the Greek election campaign of April 2000. In early 2001, Greek experts held a series of practical meetings with their Turkish counterparts on how to prepare for membership negotiations. Ambassador Agathocles on August 3, 2001 told the European Policy Centre that 'Greece was actually Turkey's biggest advocate'. Both countries have a more detailed understanding of the Balkans than do Scandinavians. However, Greek determination that Cyprus should be in the first wave of enlargement can easily translate into the view that Turkey should have a special status as a member of a European concert rather than becoming a full member. Greece has invoked the independence of the Greek Republic of Cyprus to justify not exerting the same degree of pressure for the compromises on principle needed for a settlement that it expects Turkey to exert on Turkish Cypriots. **Scandinavian** public opinion strongly supports enlargement to the Baltic states. All Scandinavian states share deeply held convictions that Turkey is too militaristic for a democracy, is insufficiently protective of the environment, and deficient in promoting the



rights of individuals and minority groups. Understanding of the civil war in South-east Turkey has been strongly influenced by Kurdish immigrants. **Sweden** joined Greece in vetoing Turkish candidature at Cologne. During its own Presidency, Sweden avoided all serious discussion of timetables and derogations on the ground that Turkey is not yet in the picture. Turkey must first fulfill undertakings on human rights, beginning with the abolition of the death penalty demanded by Gunnar Persson on 10 March, 2001. For **Finland**, Turkey was a central concern of its Presidency, mediating between the EU and the USA to make the Helsinki breakthrough by convincing Turkey that positive developments from the EU15 depended on Turkey's own actions.

Austrian attitudes have been close to those of Germany, with a special interest in enlargement to Slovenia. However, Austrian opposition to all immigration, to a Turkish military role in the Balkans, and to the admission of a secular Islamic state is closer to that of German Christian Democrats than of German Socialists.

The **Irish** and **Portuguese** governments have gone along with both the exclusion of Turkey at Luxembourg and its inclusion at Helsinki. Ireland has a natural sympathy with the Cypriot government because of the analogy with its Northern part seceding under the protection of a powerful neighbour. The negative Irish vote on the Nice treaty may indicate a desire to protect the agricultural industry from greater competition after enlargement, a concern also to be found in Portugal.

Of the Benelux countries, **Luxembourg** has shown in each of its presidencies prejudice against Turkey. As Prime Minister, and as a rapporteur in the European Parliament, Jacques Poos has been an articulate advocate of the Greek Cypriot case, finding fault only with their use of the Greek flag. **The Netherlands** have been more willing to take on board American theses of the importance of Turkey to European security. Nevertheless questions have been asked in the Dutch Parliament about human rights in Turkey, prison conditions in Turkey and the arrest of the three Kurdish mayors. **Belgium** during its Presidency in the second half of 2001 has indicated dissatisfaction with the 'wait and see' consensus on Turkey, suggesting that a five-year limit be timetabled on whether or not candidature should lead to the opening of negotiations.



What is missing from the above survey is any strong sense that peace between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean has to be created.

PART THREE

An argument against Conditionality

Writing about 'the EU as a security actor', Ole Wæver expresses the consensus that conditionality has worked. Faced with enlargement to 100+ millions in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU made membership conditional on potential members willingly paying the transition costs of reforming themselves. The EU is now the primary security actor because its leverage over countries with realistic expectations of joining has both produced internal reform and restrained nationalist foreign policies. 'Ideally,' he says, 'the EU grows at the slowest possible speed...it has to move, but almost the slower the better' (Wæver, 2000, p.262). The approach is characterized by lists. The Council at Copenhagen, Madrid and Helsinki has set out ever more rigorous criteria for new members. The Commission agrees lists of objectives with the candidates, and reports regularly on the 'progress made by each of the candidate countries in preparing for membership'. The Parliament has its own lists of demands based on internal compromises between those interested in a particular candidate. Eurobarometer 53 ranks the unrealistic conditions for new members as reported by respondents in the spring after the Helsinki summit – respect for human rights and democracy (95%), opposition to drug trafficking (92%), paying their share of the EU budget (83%), a level of development close to that of Member States (76%). Turkey was the least favoured candidate, with 44% against and 30% in favour.

Despite Turkey's adoption of most of the conditions in its own National Programme, this hopeful and cheap policy of making haste slowly is unlikely to prove so successful in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Commission's 'Opinions' on Turkey and Cyprus are predicated on the assumption that peace in the Eastern Mediterranean already exists. There is no suggestion that peace in the Eastern Mediterranean more resembles Franco-German peace between successive wars than the peace of a Scandinavian security



community. The danger that Turkey's response to the accession of Cyprus might lead to its exclusion from Europe is not discussed. One would not be able to guess from the Commission's Opinions of November 2001 prepared for the Laeken summit that Turkey has repeatedly since 1995 threatened to match the integration process of the Cyprus Republic into the EU with proportional steps to integrate Northern Cyprus into Turkey. The Commission does not focus on the danger of EU actions exacerbating a 'clash of civilisations' over Cyprus. Turkey's regional importance in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Caspian and the Middle East is treated in passing. It might be recalled that those who negotiated, signed and ratified the Treaties of Paris and Rome had to overcome a deep-seated public hostility towards West Germany. The primary purpose of economic unification with a profoundly unpopular country was at least as much to institutionalise peace as to achieve prosperity. Today, the willingness of the enlarged Germany to subsume its popular currency in the EURO, and to subsume German enlargement in a wider enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe can best be understood politically as reassurance to all its neighbours, and as a moral obligation to meet an historic opportunity. A poll for INRA Politik & Sozialforschung conducted for the Commission Delegation in Berlin during the spring of 2001 found that 68% of German respondents thought that enlargement would secure peace, and 62% that it would eliminate armed conflict and unite the continent. This is not to say that European public opinion is enthusiastic about enlargement generally, or Turkish enlargement in particular. Eurobarometer 55 conducted in the spring of 2001 found that only 21% of respondents favoured all applicants, only five percentage points more than the proportion who opposed every new applicant. The majority, 44%, thought that the EU should be open only to some of those who wished to join. However, as so often in the history of European unification, the surveys may be read as evidence of a permissive consensus that would enable political leaders to take the kind of political risk for a liberal democratic peace which they took in constructing the Communities. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and President Giscard d'Estaing took a similar risk in the enlargement to Greece and Spain. To preclude the dangers of a return to fascism or a communist triumph in Southern



Europe, they offered membership and bet on foreign direct investment without demanding first a good human rights record, a competitive economy, and evidence of adequate administrative capacity.

4. Conclusion: three policy options

Since Helsinki the EU15 have regarded the question of whether Turkish candidacy will lead to Membership as largely a matter for Turkey to decide as a sovereign state with several options. However, West Europeans also have a stake in whether their new multicultural identity would be enhanced by membership of a secular Moslem state, and whether Turkish membership would promote peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean as Greek membership helped in the Kosovo crisis. The outcome depends greatly on whether they want Turkey as an equal member sooner, later, or never. These three options are discussed in reverse order.

Permanent Non-membership

On this view, Turkey is a European power with commonalities of interest and identity with EU states. However the differences between Turkey and the EU15, whether of culture, or wealth, or state tradition, or foreign policy, are too great to be bridged in the foreseeable future to make membership viable. The immediate catalyst for taking this option might be the formal integration of North Cyprus into Turkey, with Greece and Cyprus leading the demand not to appease a strong military power breaching the EU inhibition against changes of frontiers that do not have the consent of the parties affected. Another route to this option might be the suggestion of the Belgian Presidency that there should be a review of the Turkish candidacy five years after the Helsinki summit, i.e. in December 2004. This deadline is more likely to lead to a negative result in Brussels than to promote speedier reform in Turkey.

Most of those holding this opinion want to establish a stable framework short of membership. This could take the form of a bilateral agreement, as in the Customs Union, or a multilateral framework like the European Conference, or the Common European

Home. Jacques Delors wanted Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine to be granted a special status as neighbours of the European Union, having both bilateral and multilateral ties. It is possible that Turkish business leaders will accept the Customs Union as a sufficient guarantee of access to the European market, and that Turkish military leaders will reluctantly accept participation that reproduces the rights they have enjoyed in the WEU. But on balance it is more likely that Turkish leaders will refuse arrangements in which, as in the Customs Union or the ESDP, Turkey permanently has to accept rules that it has had no share in making. Non-membership therefore risks taking the less benign form expressed in Huntington's geological metaphor of a clash of civilizations. Turkey might become an outcast from European joint rule, as Japan was from the League of Nations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate whether this would lead to a reversal of alliances or wars with its many neighbours.

Postponement

The Helsinki conclusions on Turkey are much more demanding than Article 28 of the 1963 treaty of Ankara. Turkey has to make a long list of political, economic and administrative reforms before negotiations can begin. The EU offers the advice of consultants to help Turkey become a member 'later' but not the commitment from Member States that would help pro-Europeans in Turkey convince their doubters. At a time when ten candidates can expect to be in the first wave, with Roumania and Bulgaria following in 2007, the deputy Director General responsible for enlargement told a Turkish audience that 'it is impossible to clearly say when Turkey would start membership negotiations' (AA News, 18 November, 2001, Michael Leigh).

One consequence of membership being so distant is that 'foreign direct investment flows into Turkey have rarely reached \$1billion in any one year, one quarter of the figure for Poland' (Loewendahl et al,2000). Their study found that Turkey's export-led industrialization is the most successful outside East Asia. The quality of Turkey's educated, young labour force ranks above all 47 countries studied, with only Ireland and Hungary coming close (Table 15). Turkey's geographic location, potential home demand,

and membership of the Customs Union are favourable to foreign investment. Yet Turkey's failure to attract as much as Poland is only partly explicable by its governmental and monetary instability, and an administrative tradition hostile to foreign ownership of national assets. These drawbacks apply also to a lesser extent in the case of Poland. The important difference seems to be that Poland is assured of early membership, which makes it more competitive in drawing from the pool of mobile capital as well as offering more assurance of a stable political and economic future. Similarly, progress on human rights, democratic and administrative reform is likely to be reduced in proportion as the date for negotiations and therefore membership becomes more distant.

It may therefore be worth considering a substantial interim measure of a kind to reassure Turkey's military, political and industrial leaders that the EU wants Turkey on board. It might be timely to suggest a revision of the treaty of Rome to allow Turkey now the right to send an 'Observer' to Council meetings where foreign policy, Customs Union or immigration matters will be on the agenda. Turkey could then claim to have a voice even if it has no vote or right to redistribution of resources. This need not imply a similar voice for the Russian Federation until it too participates in a Customs Union or contributes to the European Rapid Reaction Force.

Early membership with long derogations

To establish pluralist pro-Western regimes in Spain and Portugal, German and French leaders promoted their early EU membership combined with long derogations to allow adjustment on both sides in agriculture and fisheries. Improvement in human rights was to be a result of, not a condition for, membership. The prospect of early membership enabled the King of Spain to overcome those in the army, police and Church who feared for their privileges and the future of their country. The prospect of early membership brought the foreign direct investment that enabled the government to accept the loss of tariff revenue and the loss of support from businessmen privileged by import substitution. If Turkish membership would be better for Turkey and for the stability of Europe, then the Iberian precedent might justify taking this risky option.

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